Gaurav Mehla v. State of Haryana (2026): a recruitment defect confined to the appointment stage is curable, not void ab initio
The Supreme Court analytically split a public recruitment into three stages — advertisement, selection by interview, and the formal appointment decision — and held that the absence of statutorily mandated official members from the appointing Board's meeting under amended Rule 3 did not vitiate an otherwise fair and transparent recruitment; the defect was curable by reconvening a properly constituted Board, not fatal, especially where the appointees bore no responsibility and had served over a decade.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 641; SLP (C) No. 23061 of 2025
- Neutral citation
- 2026 INSC 641
- Bench
- Sanjay Karol, J., Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J.
- Decided
- 11 June 2026
In Gaurav Mehla & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. (2026 INSC 641), a Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh (Justice Kotiswar Singh writing) allowed a service appeal that had run against the appellants through every forum below. The question was one that recurs across public employment: does every infraction of a recruitment procedure necessarily render an appointment void in law? The Court answered no, and in doing so supplied a framework — a three-stage anatomy of recruitment, and a test for locating where a defect sits within it — that reaches well beyond the cooperative-society setting in which it arose.
The facts
The appellants were appointed in 2014 to the posts of Clerk-cum-Salesman and Peon-cum-Chowkidar in the Thanesar Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Ltd., Kurukshetra, following a recruitment initiated with the Registrar's permission. An advertisement was issued on 11 July 2014, interviews were conducted on 11 August 2014, and the Board of Directors approved the appointments in its meeting of 13 August 2014. The appellants joined and served continuously thereafter.
Two members of the Society then challenged the appointments before the Registrar under Section 27 of the Haryana Cooperative Societies Act, 1984. Their principal ground was a violation of amended Rule 3 of the Service Rules, 2003 — which, after a 2011 amendment adopted by the Society, made "compulsory" the presence and concurrence of the Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies, the Inspector Cooperative Societies and the District Manager, HAFED, at the meeting where the appointment decision is taken. It was admitted that none of these three officials attended the meeting of 13 August 2014. The Additional Registrar set aside the appointments (06.06.2017); the Additional Chief Secretary affirmed that order (29.09.2017); the Single Judge dismissed the writ petition (22.04.2024); and the Division Bench affirmed (29.07.2025). The appellants were removed from service on 19 August 2025, after roughly eleven years.
Locating the defect: the three stages of recruitment
The Court's central move was structural. It held that a recruitment process, viewed as a whole, can be split into three stages: first, notification of vacancies by advertisement and inviting eligible candidates; second, the manner of recruitment — here, selection by interview under Rule 15; and third, the formal appointment by the competent appointing authority.
Examined stage by stage, the first two disclosed no fundamental defect. The advertisement had appeared in two newspapers (English and Hindi); the objection that no last date was fixed failed because the notice stipulated a 21-day window; the complaint about the Delhi edition of The Indian Express was immaterial absent any allegation that it was not circulated in Haryana; and there was no adverse finding on the advertisement by any forum below. As to the interview, there was no allegation of fraud, manipulation, ineligibility, or of any qualified candidate being ignored. The only defect lay at the third stage — the absence of the mandated officials from the appointing Board's meeting.
Mandatory in form, salutary in function
The respondents argued that because Rule 3 uses "compulsory," its breach rendered the appointments void ab initio, and that Rule 35 (a general three-member quorum for Managing Committee meetings) could not override a special provision governing appointments. The Court accepted that Rule 3 is mandatory in terms, but parsed why the requirement exists. The Board of Directors consists of elected members who may not be proficient in service and technical matters; the non-elected officials — the Assistant Registrar, the Inspector and the District Manager, HAFED — are better placed to verify that the recruitment conformed to the Rules and that only eligible candidates were recommended. Their role, the Court held, is "essentially supervisory in nature" — a cross-check on the process rather than a source of the appointing power itself.
From that functional reading followed the consequence: their absence did not invalidate a recruitment that was otherwise sound. The very purpose the officials serve — confirming that advertisement, interview and eligibility were properly handled — could still be secured by reconvening the Board with those officials present. The Court read Rule 3 alongside Rule 35 and Section 36 of the 1984 Act (which provides that acts of a cooperative society are not invalidated "by reason only of the existence of any defect in procedure or in the constitution" of the committee) to support the conclusion that the lapse was an irregularity capable of rectification, not a nullity.
Severability and curability
Having isolated the defect at stage three, the Court held that stage severable from the first two.
We are of the view that the third stage of the recruitment process is severable and can be separated from the early two phases without affecting the validity of the earlier two stages.
Two features made the defect curable rather than fatal. First, it was not attributable to the candidates: the appellants had no role in the composition of the Board or the attendance of its officials, and settled principle forbids penalising candidates for institutional lapses of the recruiting authority. Second, rectifying stage three "does not involve the candidates" — the Board can simply reconvene, properly constituted, without disturbing the advertisement or the interview. By contrast, the Court was careful to mark what would go to the root: had the posts not been properly advertised (denying eligible candidates the chance to apply, in breach of Articles 14 and 16), or had the interview been marked by fraud, manipulation or the consideration of ineligible candidates, the defect would have vitiated the process. Those are defects at stages one and two — the substance of the selection — and they are not curable in the same way.
The order
The Court set aside the Division Bench's judgment of 29.07.2025 and directed the Society to reconvene a Board meeting, with the three official members present, to reconsider the appointments — but expressly barred any re-examination of the first two stages: the reconvened Board may not reopen the adequacy of the advertisement or the conduct of the interview. It may only test, at the third stage, whether the appellants possessed the essential qualifications, suffered no disqualification, were in fact the candidates recommended on the interview, and whether any more meritorious eligible candidate was ignored. The exercise was to be completed within one month. If, on reconsideration, the appellants are found eligible and not disqualified, they are to be re-appointed with past service counted for all purposes — but without arrears of pay or allowances for the period out of service.
Why it matters
The transferable value of Gaurav Mehla is its diagnostic method. Rather than asking the blunt question — was a mandatory rule breached? — the Court asks a sharper one: where in the recruitment does the defect sit, and does it go to the root? A flaw in advertisement or selection corrupts the substance of the competition and typically voids the process; a flaw confined to the mechanics of the final appointing decision, which the candidates neither caused nor could control, is presumptively curable by re-doing that discrete step. The label "mandatory" fixes that a requirement must be met; it does not, by itself, fix that non-compliance is incurable. Read together with the Court's insistence that long, unblemished service and the absence of candidate fault weigh in the equitable balance, the judgment offers a disciplined alternative to the all-or-nothing instinct that a single procedural breach must sink an entire recruitment.
Related reading
- State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3): the Constitution Bench on regularisation and public employment
- Saurav Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh: horizontal reservation and open-merit selection
- When is a statutory requirement mandatory or merely directory?
- Bhikhani Devi v. Union of India: long service without regularisation
Sources
Related reading
Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court: the rules of the game cannot change midway
Baisakhi Bhattacharyya v. State of West Bengal: cancelling the 2016 WBSSC panel
Sivanandan C.T. v. High Court of Kerala: legitimate expectation as a facet of Article 14
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