On 29 April 2026, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court comprising Justice A. S. Gadkari and Justice Ranjitsinha Bhonsale held that denial of a Police Clearance Certificate for a Public Service Vehicle badge — to a petitioner acquitted in the 26/11 case but separately convicted in the 2008 Rampur CRPF camp attack — is a reasonable restriction on the right to livelihood under Article 21.
On 29 May 2026, a two-judge bench awarded ₹11 lakh in constitutional compensation for 24 days of illegal incarceration after a parole-release order, reiterating the 'obey first, appeal later' principle.
In January 2026, a Calcutta HC Division Bench upheld a divorce decree on the ground of cruelty under section 13(1)(ia) HMA, holding that a husband maligning his wife at her workplace, questioning her chastity and abusing her before colleagues strikes at the core of dignity protected under Article 21.
On 11 March 2026, a two-judge bench permitted withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from a thirteen-year permanent-vegetative-state patient, classifying clinically assisted nutrition and hydration as medical treatment under the Common Cause framework.
On 13 April 2026, a two-judge bench held that the safety of commuters on national highways is an integral facet of the right to life with dignity under Article 21, and issued sweeping directions under Article 142 to NHAI, MoRTH, NHIDCL and State PWDs — including a ban on highway-shoulder parking and 75-day compliance reporting.
On 29 May 2026, Justice Sachin Datta of the Delhi High Court delivered a 144-page judgment recognising the Right to be Forgotten as an integral facet of informational privacy under Article 21 and laying down a workable framework for de-indexing judicial records.
Justice Neerja K. Kalson held that a maternal grandmother in actual care and custody of her granddaughter has sufficient eligibility to maintain a section 125 CrPC application on the minor's behalf where the parental relationship has broken down; the minor's statutory right to maintenance cannot be defeated by a technical objection to who instituted the petition.
On 19 May 2026, a two-judge bench held that the first proviso to Section 223(1) BNSS — requiring the accused to be heard before cognizance is taken on a complaint — is a mandatory, substantive Article 21 right; cognizance without compliance is void ab initio, and the rule applies to PMLA complaints where cognizance is taken on or after 1 July 2024 even if the complaint was filed earlier.
On 24 April 2026, a two-judge bench permitted the medical termination of a 15-year-old's 28-week pregnancy, holding that Article 21's reproductive-autonomy guarantee — particularly for a pregnant minor — takes precedence over the MTP Act's statutory 24-week outer limit, and that adoption cannot be offered as a substitute for forced continuation.
On 28 April 2026, a Madras HC Division Bench struck down Tamil Nadu G.O. Ms. No. 18 of 13 March 2026 restricting maternity leave for a third pregnancy to 12 weeks, operationalising K. Umadevi (2025) and anchoring maternity benefit as a facet of Article 21 reproductive autonomy.
On 28 May 2026, a two-judge bench held that the recall power under Section 311 CrPC cannot be used to plug defence lacunae or re-traumatise a rape prosecutrix four years after her cross-examination.
On 6 November 1996, a three-judge bench held that once the appropriate Government issues a Section 10 notification under the Contract Labour Act prohibiting contract labour in a process, the displaced workers stand automatically absorbed into the principal employer's establishment. The doctrine lived for five years before a Constitution Bench overruled it in SAIL.
On 16 December 1983, a three-judge bench held that Article 21 derives its life-breath from the Directive Principles and laid the foundation for continuing-mandamus supervision of bonded-labour rehabilitation.
On 11 May 2020, the Supreme Court applied the Anuradha Bhasin framework to J&K's 4G blackout, constituting a Special Committee and holding that restrictions must be calibrated territorially and temporally to what is actually necessary.
On 13 February 1996 — six months before *Vellore* — a Division Bench of the Supreme Court led by Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy applied the absolute-liability doctrine of *Oleum Gas Leak* to five chemical units at Bichhri village in Rajasthan and operationalised the polluter-pays principle as a remediation-cost obligation. The judgment is doctrinally the antecedent to *Vellore* on polluter-pays, the first explicit reception of customary international environmental law into Indian law, and — in its 2011 execution arc — confirmed recovery of ₹37.385 crore plus interest from the polluters.
On 13 December 2021, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court issued notice on a writ petition seeking recognition of gig workers as workers within the Indian labour-law architecture, social security entitlements under the Code on Social Security 2020 Chapter IX, and operational implementation of the Unorganised Workers' Social Security Act 2008 — a doctrinal classification question that remains pending.
On 12 April 2021, a single judge of the Delhi High Court granted interim de-indexing of news reports of a prosecution that had ended in acquittal, applying the right to be forgotten under Article 21.
A 2016 Delhi High Court division bench refused to read constitutional restraints into a click-wrap consent transaction but moulded transitional relief — and the case has been pending before a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court ever since.
On 27 October 2021, a three-judge bench refused the Union's national-security plea and constituted an expert committee to investigate the Pegasus spyware allegations against Indian citizens.
On 13 December 1996, taking suo motu cognisance of a press report on a Himachal motel that had encroached on protected forest land and diverted the Beas, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court formally received the Public Trust Doctrine into Indian law — quashing the prior approvals and lease, ordering restitution at the motel's cost and issuing show-cause on exemplary damages. A digest of the doctrine, why the Court read it into Articles 21 and 48A, and how it has since travelled from rivers and forests to spectrum and coal.
On 30 December 1996 — the penultimate working day before his retirement — Justice Kuldip Singh, sitting with Justice Faizan Uddin, delivered the Taj Trapezium judgment: 292 enumerated industries within a 10,400 square kilometre polygon around the Taj Mahal were directed to switch to natural gas or relocate outside the Zone, with labour-protective relief for workers in relocated units. A digest of how the Bench operationalised the *Vellore* principles, why it created a monument-centric zoning template, and how the continuing-mandamus device powered later orders from CNG-Delhi to subsequent TTZ rulings.
On 20 March 2026, Justice Sachin Datta of the Delhi High Court quashed Look Out Circulars against NDTV founders Prannoy and Radhika Roy, holding that an LOC sustained for ~6 years without a chargesheet — and after the underlying agency itself closed one of the two FIRs — is an unjustified curtailment of the Article 21 right to travel.
On 30 August 2001, a five-judge Constitution Bench unanimously held that no automatic absorption flows from a Section 10 notification under the Contract Labour Act. Air India Statutory Corporation was prospectively overruled. The remedy for displaced contract workers is industrial adjudication — not direct constitutional absorption.
On 9 January 1991, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court — Justices K.N. Singh and N.D. Ojha — articulated the right to enjoyment of pollution-free water and air as part of the right to life under Article 21, and held that PIL standing in environmental matters does not require a personal-injury showing. On the facts the petition was dismissed as not bona fide and ₹5,000 costs imposed, but the legal principles — though technically obiter — have been treated as authoritative in every subsequent environmental Article 21 case.
On 23 November 2020, the Orissa High Court refused bail and articulated India's first judicial recognition of the right to be forgotten for survivors of sexual offences.
On 28 April 1976, in the depths of the Emergency, a five-judge Constitution Bench held by 4:1 that a person detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act could not move habeas corpus because the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 stood suspended by the Presidential Proclamation under Article 359. Justice H.R. Khanna's sole dissent — that life and liberty are not the Constitution's gift to be taken away by it — cost him the Chief Justiceship. Forty-one years later, in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, a nine-judge Bench explicitly overruled the majority and adopted the Khanna dissent as the constitutional position. A digest of the judgment, its setting, the dissent, the supersession, and the doctrine that has supplanted it.
On 28 September 2001, a five-judge Constitution Bench upheld the constitutional validity of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 — but read its principal provision as requiring the husband to make reasonable and fair provision for the maintenance of the divorced wife beyond the iddat period, including for her future. The judgment is the foundational doctrinal contribution that preserved the maintenance architecture of Shah Bano through interpretation of the 1986 Act, and supplies the doctrinal frame within which the more recent Mohd Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana operates.
On 26 September 2018, a five-judge Constitution Bench held by 4:1 that the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 was constitutionally valid in substantial part, that its passage as a Money Bill was within Parliament's competence, and that Section 7 — the mandatory linking of Aadhaar with benefits — was sustainable. Section 57 — permitting private entities to seek Aadhaar authentication — and parts of Section 33(2) were struck down. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud dissented entirely. A digest of the judgment, the Money Bill question, and the doctrinal arc from the 9-judge privacy ruling through this 5-judge substantive engagement.
On 2 July 2009, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court — A.P. Shah CJ and S. Muralidhar J — read down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code to exclude consensual sexual acts between adults in private. The judgment articulated, for the first time in Indian constitutional law, sexual orientation as an analogous ground under Article 15, deployed Article 21 to protect sexual autonomy in the personal sphere, recast Article 14 around effect-based discrimination, and drew the distinction between constitutional morality and popular morality. The Supreme Court overruled it in Suresh Kumar Koushal in December 2013; nearly five years later, the five-judge bench in Navtej Singh Johar vindicated the reasoning. A close reading of the 2009 doctrinal moment and the procedural arc that followed.
On 10 July 1985, a five-judge Constitution Bench held in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation that the right to life under Article 21 includes the right to livelihood — because no person can live without the means of living. The Bench was hearing a petition by pavement dwellers in Bombay challenging their eviction under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. The petitioners ultimately did not succeed in vacating the eviction architecture, but the doctrinal contribution — that livelihood is part of Article 21 — has shaped four decades of socio-economic-rights jurisprudence.
On 30 July 1992 a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka read the right to education out of Article 21 read with the Directive Principles in Articles 38, 39, 41 and 45 and struck down capitation fees in professional colleges. Seven months later, on 4 February 1993, a five-judge Constitution Bench in Unni Krishnan v. State of A.P. refined and re-stated the right — bifurcating its content so that free and compulsory education up to the age of fourteen became enforceable as a fundamental right (later codified as Article 21A by the 86th Amendment) while education beyond that age remained subject to the State's economic capacity. The Bench also imposed the free-seats / payment-seats scheme on private unaided professional institutions and capped capitation fees as unconstitutional. The combined two-step articulation set the doctrinal frame from which the 86th Amendment (2002), the RTE Act 2009, Society for Unaided Private Schools (2012) and Pramati (2014) all proceeded.
The 1996 ruling that converted custodial protection from constitutional aspiration into station-house procedure — and the eleven directions that still govern every arrest in India, now carried over into Section 35 BNSS and beyond. A practitioner's digest.
Bhagwati J.'s 1979 directions ordered the release of thousands of undertrials who had been in custody longer than the sentence the offence carried — and, in doing so, read speedy trial into Article 21. A close digest of the reasoning, with a reading on how it now constrains pre-trial detention under the BNSS.
How a passport-impoundment order led a seven-judge Bench to overrule Gopalan, fuse Articles 14, 19 and 21 into the golden triangle, and import substantive fairness into Indian constitutional law — the most consequential constitutional ruling of the post-Emergency era.
The Supreme Court's May 2026 directions on curbing sex trafficking of women and children have been widely reported in the institutional architecture they engage — directions to States, calls for inter-agency coordination, and a continuing supervisory role for the Court. A practitioner's read on the framework the directions sit within: the constitutional protection of life and dignity under Article 21, the ITPA framework, and the trafficking-protection architecture that the Court has been developing across several decades.
On 24 August 2017, a nine-judge Bench of the Supreme Court held — without dissent, in 547 pages across six opinions — that the right to privacy is protected as a fundamental right under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The judgment overruled M.P. Sharma (1954) and Kharak Singh (1962) in significant part, and supplied the three-prong proportionality test for state action affecting privacy. A close digest.
A five-judge Constitution Bench in 1980 upheld the constitutional validity of the death penalty by a 4:1 majority, with Bhagwati J. delivering a powerful dissent two years later. The Sarkaria J. majority opinion gave the bar the 'rarest of rare' doctrine, the special-reasons requirement under Section 354(3) CrPC, and the doctrinal architecture of the pre-sentence hearing under Section 235(2) — the framework that anchors every contemporary sentencing appeal.
On 6 September 2018, a five-judge Constitution Bench unanimously read down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code in so far as it criminalised consensual sexual conduct between adults. The judgment overruled Suresh Kumar Koushal (2013), deployed the Puttaswamy privacy framework, and supplied four substantial concurring opinions on dignity, equality and constitutional morality. A digest of the holding, the reasoning, and the doctrinal lineage.
On 9 March 2018, a five-judge Constitution Bench unanimously held that the right to die with dignity is part of the right to life under Article 21, legalised passive euthanasia, and recognised the Advance Medical Directive (the 'living will') as the procedural mechanism through which an individual's end-of-life preferences could be honoured. The judgment is the foundational architecture of end-of-life law in India. A digest of the holding, the procedural framework, and the 2023 simplification that followed.
On 28 August 1996, a three-judge Bench led by Justice Kuldip Singh held that 'sustainable development', the 'precautionary principle' and the 'polluter pays' principle are part of the law of the land — and ordered the discharge of pollution fees by tanneries in Tamil Nadu that had contaminated the River Palar and rendered 35,000 hectares of agricultural land unfit for cultivation. The judgment, together with *M.C. Mehta (Oleum Gas Leak)*, supplies the foundational architecture of Indian environmental law. A digest of the doctrines, the directions, and what they require.
Less than a year after the Bhopal disaster, an oleum gas leak from a Shriram unit in Delhi prompted the Supreme Court — through a Constitution Bench led by Bhagwati CJ — to depart from the English strict-liability framework of Rylands v. Fletcher and to formulate a doctrine of absolute liability for enterprises engaged in hazardous activities. The judgment is the doctrinal foundation of Indian environmental and industrial liability law. A digest of the rule, why the Court declined to apply Rylands, and how the doctrine continues to operate four decades on.
Seven years before *Common Cause* would articulate the comprehensive constitutional framework, *Aruna Shanbaug* recognised passive euthanasia in Indian law for the first time. The 2011 disposition — addressing a petition seeking withdrawal of life support for a nurse who had been in a persistent vegetative state for nearly four decades following a brutal sexual assault — supplied the doctrinal architecture that *Common Cause* would later complete. A digest of the case, the holding, and the relationship between the two judgments.
On 13 May 2016, a two-judge Bench led by Justice Dipak Misra upheld the constitutional validity of Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code — the criminal-defamation framework — against challenges based on the freedom of speech and expression. The reasoning rested on the proposition that reputation is constitutionally protected under Article 21, and that the criminal-defamation framework, properly construed, does not produce an undue chilling effect on expression. A digest of the holding, the doctrinal architecture, and the contemporary practitioner's framework.
Section 356 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita introduces, for the first time in the Indian general criminal-procedure framework, a structured architecture for trial in absentia of proclaimed offenders. The framework deems absconding to operate as a waiver of the right to be present and tried in person — subject to elaborate procedural safeguards including a 90-day mandatory wait, two consecutive arrest warrants, paper publication and State-funded counsel. A practitioner's read on the section, the constitutional question, and the early High Court engagement.
On 8 March 2018, a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court — Chief Justice Dipak Misra, Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, and Justice D.Y. Chandrachud — set aside the Kerala High Court's annulment of Hadiya's marriage and reaffirmed the constitutional protection of an adult's right to choose her faith and her life partner. The substantive disposition engaged the constitutional architecture of autonomy, identity, and personal liberty, and articulated doctrinal contributions that have anchored subsequent engagement with the right to choose. A digest of the holding, the doctrinal architecture, and the broader trajectory.