The Supreme Court affirmed the setting aside of a 1994 compromise decree in a partition suit, holding that Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC requires a written agreement signed by the parties, that an advocate's implied authority does not extend to signing away a client's substantive property rights without express authorisation or exigency, and that a roughly 25-year delay could be excused where a fraudulent compromise decree defeated substantive rights.
The Supreme Court dismissed a liquidator's Section 62 IBC appeal as time-barred, holding that the Code allows only 45 days plus a 15-day grace period to file, and that a defectively filed appeal must be cured within 28 days under the Supreme Court Rules — beyond which the right to appeal is extinguished and no delay can be condoned.
In 2011 the Supreme Court refused the State of Haryana's suit to be declared owner of a citizen's land by adverse possession, restored possession to the owner, and delivered a sweeping critique of the doctrine as irrational and disproportionate — reaffirming the right to property as a constitutional and human right.
The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a sexual-harassment complaint as time-barred under section 9 of the POSH Act. A complaint must be filed within three months of the last incident, extendable by three more for recorded reasons, and later administrative actions extend that window only if they share a direct nexus with the harassment.
In 2013 the Supreme Court consolidated the scattered principles governing condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act into a single authoritative set of propositions — the standard checklist on what counts as sufficient cause.
A three-judge bench held in 2019 that a person who has perfected title by adverse possession can use it to found a suit, not merely as a defence, resolving conflicting two-judge authority under Article 65 of the Limitation Act.
On 24 February 2026, the Supreme Court held that a stale and procedurally defective Scheme of Arrangement under Sections 391–394 of the Companies Act 1956 cannot defeat a Section 7 IBC application; Section 238 IBC override extends to defunct schemes; a 28-year corporate dispute reaches doctrinal resolution.
Bombay HC holds that setting aside an award under Sections 34/37 restores parties to the pre-award position, leaving the disputes free to be re-arbitrated.
A three-judge bench held that each dishonour on re-presentation of a cheque founds a fresh s.138 cause of action, overruling Sadanandan Bhadran's rule.
On 30 May 2022 a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court, in Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd v. A. Balakrishnan, held that the liability arising from a Recovery Certificate issued by a Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 19 of the RDDBFI Act is a 'financial debt' within the meaning of Section 5(8) of the IBC, that the holder of such a Certificate is a 'financial creditor' under Section 5(7) entitled to file a Section 7 application, and — most consequentially for limitation practice — that the Certificate creates a fresh cause of action so that limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act runs from the date of its issuance, not from the date of the original default. A close reading of the bench's reasoning, its extension of the Dena Bank v. C. Shivakumar Reddy line, and what the ruling has come to mean for banks, ARCs and corporate debtors at the s.7 admission stage.