The foundational judgment on CCI procedure. A three-judge Bench held that a direction to the Director General to investigate under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act is an administrative, prima facie order — not a final adjudication and not appealable to the Tribunal. It also held that the Commission must still record minimal reasons, need not hear the party at that stage, and is a necessary party once an appeal is filed.
On 7 March 2011, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court quashed the acquisition of fertile agricultural land for a district jail at Shahjahanpur, holding that the emergency power under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 cannot be invoked to dispense with the landowner's right to object under Section 5A absent a real and demonstrable urgency. A digest of the holding, the reasoning on urgency and alternative sites, and where the decision sits in the urgency-clause line.
On 15 April 2011, a two-judge bench of Justices G.S. Singhvi and A.K. Ganguly held that the power under Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to dispense with the Section 5A objection enquiry is an extraordinary power — available only where the public purpose cannot brook even a few weeks' delay. Acquisition for planned industrial and residential development near Greater Noida, which by its nature takes years, could not justify denying landowners their Section 5A hearing. Once urgency is challenged, the burden falls on the State to justify the dispensation.
The Supreme Court set aside an NCDRC order that found medical negligence in antenatal care, when the complaint had pleaded negligence only in post-delivery management. A consumer forum cannot construct a new case the complainant never pleaded, and relief must stay confined to the case as pleaded.
The Delhi High Court held that director disqualification under Section 164(2) of the Companies Act 2013 operates prospectively and arises automatically, without any prior hearing. But it found no statutory basis for the MCA to deactivate the disqualified directors' DINs and DSCs, and ordered them reactivated.
The Supreme Court partly allowed an electricity-company clerk's appeal, holding that once a defective departmental inquiry is set aside and misconduct is later proved on fresh evidence, the disciplinary authority cannot mechanically fall back on the old, pre-remand show-cause notice and reimpose dismissal — it must independently apply its mind to the quantum of punishment. A digest of the facts, the holding on proportionality and natural justice, and what it means for service-law practice.
The Calcutta High Court set aside an arbitral award rendered by a sole arbitrator whom the financier had appointed unilaterally. A digest of the Section 12(5) bar, why participation is not waiver, and how the Court applied the TRF–Perkins Eastman line to declare the award a nullity opposed to public policy.
On 29 April 1969, a five-judge bench held that the rule against bias vitiated a forest-service selection and collapsed the rigid distinction between administrative and quasi-judicial action — the foundation of modern Indian natural-justice doctrine.
On 31 March 2005, a two-judge bench restated the contours of natural justice — its flexibility, the primacy of audi alteram partem, the governing role of prejudice, and the capacity of a post-decisional hearing to cure a deficient pre-decisional one.
On 4 September 1990, a Constitution Bench of five judges struck down a 'hire and fire' clause permitting termination of permanent employees without reasons and without hearing — holding that audi alteram partem must be read into State termination powers and that arbitrary, unguided dismissal violates Article 14.
On 1 October 1993, a five-judge Constitution Bench held that a delinquent employee is entitled to a copy of the inquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority decides — but tempered the remedy with a prejudice test, making non-supply void only where the employee shows prejudice.
On 19 December 2008, the Supreme Court held that a departmental enquiry finding cannot rest on the inquiry officer's ipse dixit, surmise or conjecture — that suspicion is never a substitute for legal proof, and that disciplinary orders carrying civil consequences must be supported by recorded reasons.
On 26 November 2025, the Karnataka High Court at Dharwad held that the Civil Rights Enforcement Cell has no power to investigate the validity of a caste certificate suo motu — its jurisdiction arises only on a reference from the District Caste Verification Committee.
On 11 July 1985, a five-judge Constitution Bench upheld the second proviso to Article 311(2) — the three situations in which a civil servant may be dismissed without the constitutional inquiry — while holding the recorded satisfaction reviewable by courts for relevance and bona fides.
On 26 October 1998, a two-judge bench held that the existence of an alternative statutory remedy is a rule of self-imposed discretion, not an absolute bar — and identified the recognised exceptions, including breach of natural justice, in which a writ will still lie under Article 226.
On 2 December 1977, a five-judge Constitution Bench held that Article 324 vests the Election Commission of India with plenary and residuary powers wherever statute or rules are silent, but that those powers must be exercised consistently with natural justice and on reasons stated when the order is made — not on reasons supplied later by affidavit. The judgment also reaffirmed that Article 329(b) bars judicial interference with the election process between notification and declaration, leaving the election petition as the sole post-result remedy.
The Supreme Court's first major pronouncement on the 2024 RBI Master Directions on Fraud Risk Management. A 2-judge bench held three things: there is no inherent right to a personal or oral hearing before fraud classification because the determination is grounded in objective documentary evidence and a written show-cause-and-reply procedure satisfies natural justice; banks must furnish the full Forensic Audit Report to the borrower as the rule, with only narrow exceptions for genuinely third-party sensitive material; and the doctrinal distinction between fraud — which carries criminality — and wilful default — which does not — justifies the differentiated procedural protections under the two regulatory regimes.
A 2-judge bench of the Supreme Court — *Dr D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.* and *Hima Kohli, J.* — held in March 2023 that the principle of audi alteram partem must be read into Clauses 8.9.4 and 8.9.5 of the *Reserve Bank of India (Frauds Classification and Reporting by Commercial Banks and Select FIs) Directions 2016*. Classification of a borrower's account as 'fraud' by a Joint Lenders' Forum carries the consequences of civil death — credit-access debarment, reputational harm, director-disqualification fallout — and engages Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21. The borrower is entitled to notice, to supply of the forensic audit report (or its conclusions), to an opportunity to be heard and to a reasoned order before classification. No prior hearing is required before the lodging of an FIR under *Section 154* of the *Code of Criminal Procedure*, which is a separate criminal-law step.