On 26 April 2011, a two-judge bench of Justices G.S. Singhvi and Asok Kumar Ganguly set out the principles on what constitutes 'taking of possession' of acquired land. There is no universal rule — the mode turns on the nature of the land. For vacant land, the authority going to the spot and drawing up a panchnama ordinarily suffices; where a crop is standing or a structure exists, notice to the occupier and possession before independent witnesses is ordinarily required. It remains the go-to statement of the possession-and-vesting principles.
On 7 March 2011, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court quashed the acquisition of fertile agricultural land for a district jail at Shahjahanpur, holding that the emergency power under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 cannot be invoked to dispense with the landowner's right to object under Section 5A absent a real and demonstrable urgency. A digest of the holding, the reasoning on urgency and alternative sites, and where the decision sits in the urgency-clause line.
On 15 April 2011, a two-judge bench of Justices G.S. Singhvi and A.K. Ganguly held that the power under Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to dispense with the Section 5A objection enquiry is an extraordinary power — available only where the public purpose cannot brook even a few weeks' delay. Acquisition for planned industrial and residential development near Greater Noida, which by its nature takes years, could not justify denying landowners their Section 5A hearing. Once urgency is challenged, the burden falls on the State to justify the dispensation.
The Bombay High Court set aside a Section 17 order that had excused a party from producing the very contract said to breach a joint-venture non-compete, holding that a confidentiality clause inside an allegedly offending agreement cannot immunise that agreement from disclosure. A digest of the facts, the holding on confidentiality versus court-directed disclosure, the Section 17 set-aside and remand, and what it means for arbitration practice.
A 2-judge bench of the Supreme Court — *Altamas Kabir, J.* and *Cyriac Joseph, J.* — held on 16 July 2009 that the Debts Recovery Tribunal's jurisdiction under *Section 17* of the *SARFAESI Act 2002* is not confined to the moment a *Section 13(4)* measure is taken; it extends to every action by the secured creditor in furtherance of *Section 13(4)*, including post-possession sale, sale confirmation and consequential steps. The DRT may scrutinise such actions on substantive grounds, set them aside, and — where illegality is established — restore the status quo ante. The decision is the foundational authority on the substantive (rather than merely supervisory) character of *Section 17* review.
On 9 January 2025, a two-judge bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan clarified the relationship between the Debt Recovery Tribunal's jurisdiction under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act and the civil courts' residual jurisdiction over questions of title, partition, and the validity of pre-enforcement deeds. The judgment holds that the DRT's exclusive jurisdiction extends to the legality of Section 13(4) measures — and no further. Questions of ownership and the validity of deeds predating the bank's enforcement remain triable by civil courts under Section 9 of the CPC.