Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India: the remission quashed
On 8 January 2024, a two-judge bench quashed the premature release of eleven convicts, holding that Gujarat was not the appropriate Government to grant remission under Section 432(7) CrPC and that the order directing it to act had been obtained by suppression of material facts.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 24
- Bench
- B.V. Nagarathna, J., Ujjal Bhuyan, J.
- Decided
- 8 January 2024
The facts in brief
Bilkis Bano was gang-raped, and several members of her family were murdered, during the communal violence in Gujarat in 2002. Because of concerns over the fairness of a trial in Gujarat, the proceedings were transferred to Maharashtra, where eleven accused were convicted. The convictions were upheld through the appellate chain.
One of the convicts, having served more than fifteen years, sought remission of his sentence. On 13 May 2022, the Supreme Court directed the Government of Gujarat to consider his remission application under its 1992 policy. Acting on that direction, Gujarat granted remission and released all eleven convicts in August 2022. The releases provoked national controversy.
Bilkis Bano herself, together with several public-interest petitioners, challenged the releases under Article 32 of the Constitution. The petitions came before a bench of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan, who delivered judgment on 8 January 2024.
The questions before the Court
Three questions framed the case. First, which Government — Gujarat or Maharashtra — was the "appropriate Government" competent to decide the remission applications under Section 432(7) of the CrPC. Second, what was the status of the Court's own earlier order of 13 May 2022, which had directed Gujarat to decide the matter. Third, whether a victim and bona fide public-interest petitioners could invoke Article 32 to challenge an executive grant of remission.
What the Court held
Gujarat was not the appropriate Government
Section 432(7) of the CrPC defines the "appropriate Government" by reference to the place where the offender was sentenced. Because the trial had been transferred to Maharashtra and the convictions recorded there, the appropriate Government to consider remission was Maharashtra — not Gujarat, the State where the offence had occurred. Gujarat therefore lacked jurisdiction to entertain the remission applications at all, and the orders it passed were without authority of law.
The earlier order was a nullity
The Court held that its own order of 13 May 2022, which had directed Gujarat to consider the remission application, could not stand. That order had been obtained by the convict by suppressing material facts and misleading the Court — including the suppression of an earlier coordinate-bench order that had already recognised Maharashtra as the appropriate Government. An order procured in this manner was a nullity, non est in law, and per incuriam; it bound no one and could be disregarded, and a writ of certiorari could issue against the consequences that flowed from it.
The principle the Court applied is long-settled: fraud and the administration of justice cannot coexist, and an order obtained by suppression of material facts is not insulated by its own finality.
The rule of law over an individual claim to liberty
The Court underscored that the rule of law must prevail where remission is granted without jurisdiction and in breach of statutory and constitutional safeguards. Remission is not an unfettered grace; it is a power circumscribed by statute and conditioned on the correct Government exercising it through a lawful process. Having found both the foundational order and the consequent releases legally untenable, the Court quashed the remission orders and directed the eleven convicts to surrender within two weeks.
On maintainability, the Court held that the victim's petition and the public-interest petitions were properly before it under Article 32, rejecting the argument that the challenge could not be entertained at the instance of third parties.
The doctrinal architecture
The judgment operates on two distinct planes that reinforce one another. On the statutory plane, it fixes the meaning of "appropriate Government" in Section 432(7) firmly to the place of sentencing, closing off the argument that the State where the crime was committed retains a parallel competence to remit. On the plane of judicial process, it reaffirms that an order obtained by fraud is void from inception — a principle that allows a later bench to disregard an earlier direction without the formality of review, where that direction rests on facts the petitioner deliberately concealed.
Read together, the two planes produce a single conclusion: the executive's remission power is not at large. It is anchored to the correct Government, exercised on a full and honest record, and answerable in constitutional review where either condition fails.
Where it sits in the corpus
Bilkis Bano is the leading recent authority on the "appropriate Government" question in remission and on the setting aside of fraud-tainted judicial orders. Its remission reasoning now informs the premature-release jurisprudence read under the corresponding provisions of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. It belongs to the criminal-justice-integrity strand of the Court's recent work, where the legitimacy of an outcome is measured not only by its result but by the lawfulness of the process that produced it.
What comes next
The Court subsequently dismissed review and clarification petitions filed by some of the convicts, who had sought additional time or a reconsideration of the surrender direction, reinforcing the operative order. As precedent, the decision is cited across remission and premature-release litigation, both for the jurisdictional point and for the proposition that a judicial order secured by concealment carries no authority. For litigants, it is a reminder that the place of trial — not the place of offence — governs the competence to remit, and that candour to the court is a condition of relief, not an optional courtesy.
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Sources
- Supreme Court Observer — "Supreme Court quashes the remission of 11 convicts in Bilkis Bano case": https://www.scobserver.in/journal/supreme-court-quashes-the-remission-of-11-convicts-in-bilkis-bano-case/
- LiveLaw — "Supreme Court Judgment In Bilkis Bano Case: The Law On Remission Explained": https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/supreme-court-judgment-bilkis-bano-case-laws-of-remission-explained-246701
- Verdictum — "Bilkis Bano's Case | Supreme Court Says Its Earlier Order Was Obtained By Fraud; Also Terms It 'Per Incuriam'": https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/bilkis-banos-convicts-remission-quashed-1514147
- SCC OnLine Blog — "Inside Supreme Court's verdict on premature release of 11 convicts in Bilkis Bano gang rape case": https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2024/01/09/explained-supreme-court-verdict-premature-release-11-convicts-bilkis-bano-gang-rape-case/
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