On 6 January 2025, a two-judge bench delivered a comprehensive restatement of Section 52A NDPS, holding the provision procedural and non-compliance not per se fatal unless it casts reasonable doubt on the identity and integrity of the seized substance.
On 22 April 2020, a three-judge bench held that the weight of the entire mixture — narcotic plus neutral substances — decides whether an NDPS seizure is 'small' or 'commercial', overruling E. Micheal Raj.
On 9 July 2008, a two-judge bench upheld the NDPS Act's reverse-burden provisions but read them down: the prosecution must first prove the foundational facts beyond reasonable doubt before any presumption shifts to the accused.
On 29 October 2020, a 2:1 Supreme Court bench held that NDPS officers are 'police officers' under section 25 of the Evidence Act, so a statement recorded under section 67 cannot be used as a confession to convict.
A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that a prosecution under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act cannot stand against a director or authorised signatory unless the company itself is arraigned as an accused. Vicarious liability is derivative, and the principal offender must be on the record before secondary liability can attach.
The Supreme Court held that liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act attaches only to the drawer who maintains the account on which the cheque is drawn. A director who signs a cheque on his company's account does not become the drawer in his personal capacity, and cannot be prosecuted unless the company itself is arraigned.
The Telangana High Court held that a man who pays for a sex worker's services cannot be prosecuted as a trafficker under section 370 IPC. He may be charged under section 370A(2) only if he knew, or had reason to believe, the woman was trafficked. Mere presence near a brothel is not enough.
On 12 June 2026, the Rajasthan High Court held that a former wife who continued Section 498A IPC proceedings against her ex-husband and his family after accepting ₹20 lakh as alimony and obtaining a decree of mutual divorce was abusing the process of law. The Court rejected the argument that the criminal case stood wholly independent of the settled matrimonial dispute.
The Supreme Court quashed a criminal medical-negligence prosecution against an anaesthetist, holding that an expert panel without a peer specialist is a fundamental defect, and that a nurse's failure to find the epidural space is at most civil deficiency — not the gross negligence and mens rea that Section 304-A IPC demands.
A two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court refused to quash criminal proceedings against a sonologist for deficiencies in Form F records under the PCPNDT Act, holding that blank or incomplete columns are not trivial clerical mistakes but substantive statutory violations — a springboard for the offence of female foeticide. A digest of the facts, the holding, and the statutory scheme of Sections 4(3), 5, 6 and 23.
On a Section 392 CrPC reference after a split verdict, a two-judge Supreme Court Bench doubted the long-standing rule in Sajjan Singh and referred to a larger Bench the question whether a referee judge can disturb concurrent findings of guilt the original Division Bench was unanimous on. A digest of the facts, the questions referred, and why the reference matters.
Three years after Bachan Singh restricted the death penalty to the 'rarest of rare' cases, a three-judge Bench in Machhi Singh gave that open-textured standard a working structure — five categories of circumstance and a 'balance sheet' method for weighing aggravating against mitigating factors. A digest of the facts, the framework, and the doctrine's contested later trajectory.
In 1983 a five-judge Constitution Bench struck down Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code, which had made death the only punishment for a life-convict who committed murder. A digest of the facts, the holding that a mandatory, discretion-free death sentence violates Articles 14 and 21, and the judgment's place in India's death-penalty jurisprudence.
A naval officer shot his wife's lover and asked the Supreme Court to call it culpable homicide, not murder. In 1961 the Court refused — the gap between the provocation and the killing was time enough for passion to cool. A digest of the cooling-off test under Exception 1 to s.300 IPC and the trial that helped end the jury in India.
In 1965 the Supreme Court held that a confession overheard as a soliloquy is admissible: communication to another is not essential to a confession at law.
In 1957 a three-judge bench held evidence is weighed, not counted: a conviction can rest on a single wholly reliable witness, classifying witnesses into three.
On 8 January 2024, a two-judge bench quashed the premature release of eleven convicts, holding that Gujarat was not the appropriate Government to grant remission under Section 432(7) CrPC and that the order directing it to act had been obtained by suppression of material facts.
On 13 July 2024, the Kerala High Court held that "husband" in Section 498A IPC means a married man — a woman's live-in partner, absent a legally recognised marriage, cannot be prosecuted for matrimonial cruelty, and the proceedings against him were quashed.
On 8 January 2025, the Telangana High Court reaffirmed in the BNS era that a parent who is a natural guardian taking the child from the other parent is not kidnapping under Section 137(2) BNS, and that custody disputes belong before the family court.
Decided in August 2005, a three-judge bench adopted the Bolam standard for medical negligence in India, held that criminal liability under section 304A IPC demands gross negligence, and laid down procedural safeguards against the indiscriminate prosecution of doctors.
On 13 August 2024, a two-judge bench granted bail to a UAPA accused, holding that 'bail is the rule, jail is the exception' holds good even under stringent special statutes, and that the PFI is not a First-Schedule terrorist organisation.
On 3 July 2024, a two-judge bench held that where the State cannot ensure a speedy trial, it cannot oppose bail by pleading the seriousness of the offence, and that the Watali standard is no bar to bail where prolonged incarceration meets an interminable trial.
In 2000 the Supreme Court restored a husband's dowry-death conviction while confirming the acquittal of his relatives, warning against the tendency to rope in all the in-laws and insisting on a 'proximate and live link' against each accused.
In 1945 the Privy Council acquitted Mahbub Shah of murder, holding that Section 34 IPC demands a pre-arranged plan — a shared intention, not a merely similar one — to fasten constructive liability.
The 2003 Supreme Court decision settling the value of a test identification parade — the substantive evidence is identification in court; a TIP belongs to the investigation stage, is a rule of prudence, and is not itself substantive evidence.
On 9 August 2024, a two-judge bench granted bail to Manish Sisodia in both the ED and CBI Excise Policy cases, holding that 17 months' incarceration with no trial in sight violated the Article 21 right to a speedy trial.
Vivian Bose J.'s 1955 judgment refined Section 34 IPC, holding that common intention may form on the spur of the moment but must be distinguished from a merely similar intention — a distinction 'fine but nonetheless a real one'.
In 1947 the Privy Council, through Sir John Beaumont, settled the meaning of 'fact discovered' under Section 27 of the Evidence Act — the bedrock test for every disclosure-and-recovery dispute that follows.
In 2017 a two-judge bench installed Family Welfare Committees to screen Section 498-A complaints; in 2018 a three-judge bench withdrew that extra-statutory machinery, restoring the Arnesh Kumar arrest discipline.
The 2021 Supreme Court restatement of dowry-death law, per Ramana CJI, explains the true import of 'soon before death' under Section 304B, the mandatory Section 113B presumption, and trial-court guidelines that reshaped how dowry-death cases are conducted.
Vivian Bose J.'s 1956 judgment is the perennial answer to prosecutorial over-reliance on Section 106 — it does not relieve the State of its primary burden of proving guilt, and 'especially' means exceptionally within the accused's knowledge.
On 29 April 2026, a two-judge bench dismissed thirteen writs, two SLPs and eight contempts in the long-running hate-speech batch, holding that constitutional courts cannot create criminal offences, that no legislative vacuum exists in the IPC/BNS framework, and that police failure to register a suo motu FIR is not, by itself, contempt.
On 1 April 2026, a two-judge bench applied Mihir Shah to an NDPS arrest, holding that failure to supply written grounds of arrest before remand renders the arrest illegal even where section 37 ordinarily forecloses bail.
On 29 May 2026, a two-judge bench quashed POCSO and rape proceedings against an estranged husband's family on findings of tutored 'parrot-like' testimony, and articulated for the first time at Supreme Court level an explicit ethical duty on advocates not to assist vexatious matrimonial-dispute prosecutions.
On 6 April 2026, a two-judge bench set aside convictions under section 294(b) IPC for use of an expletive in a heated exchange, holding that mere abusive or vulgar language without sexual or prurient content does not amount to obscenity.
On 19 May 2026, a two-judge bench held that a directed crime-scene re-enactment limited to physical movements does not per se amount to testimonial compulsion under Article 20(3); such material is admissible as corroborative — not substantive — evidence. Conviction restored on circumstantial proof; death sentence commuted to life.
In February 2026, the Supreme Court held that the surviving partner in a mutual suicide pact is liable for abetment under section 306 read with section 107 IPC, closing a 23-year matter.
In September 1952 the young Supreme Court laid down the foundational rule that circumstantial evidence must form a chain excluding every hypothesis but guilt.
On 23 September 2024, the Supreme Court held that viewing and storing child sexual exploitative material is punishable under s.15 POCSO and s.67B IT Act, and replaced 'child pornography' with 'CSEAM'.
In 1957 a three-judge bench held that no rule requires a dying declaration to be corroborated; a true, voluntary declaration can by itself sustain a conviction.
In October 1989 the Supreme Court gave its compact four-test restatement of the circumstantial-evidence standard, the working companion to the Sharad Sarda panchsheel.
On 20 March 2026, Justice Sachin Datta of the Delhi High Court quashed Look Out Circulars against NDTV founders Prannoy and Radhika Roy, holding that an LOC sustained for ~6 years without a chargesheet — and after the underlying agency itself closed one of the two FIRs — is an unjustified curtailment of the Article 21 right to travel.
In July 1984 a three-judge bench crystallised the five golden principles, the panchsheel, governing convictions resting wholly on circumstantial evidence.
In 1999 the Supreme Court set out the three-possibilities rule on recovery of a concealed body and held that a false explanation is only an additional link in a chain.
On 5 May 2017, a three-judge bench of Justices Dipak Misra, R. Banumathi and Ashok Bhushan dismissed the appeals filed by the four adult convicts in the December 2012 Delhi gang-rape and murder — known to public memory as the Nirbhaya case — and affirmed the death sentence imposed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the Delhi High Court. The judgment applied the rarest-of-rare doctrine articulated in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) and held that the offence fell within its scope. A digest of the holding, the doctrinal application, and the architecture of capital sentencing it confirms.
On 26 May 2026, a Supreme Court bench of Justices K.V. Viswanathan and Vijay Bishnoi modified a life sentence to the period already undergone by the appellant — a man who had spent over twenty-three years in custody without remission. The judgment reaffirms the settled position that the imposition of a life sentence does not bar modification to a fixed-term sentence where the convict has already undergone more than 14 years of imprisonment, and reads against the architecture of remission and pre-mature release under the criminal-justice system.
On 13 May 2016, a two-judge Bench led by Justice Dipak Misra upheld the constitutional validity of Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code — the criminal-defamation framework — against challenges based on the freedom of speech and expression. The reasoning rested on the proposition that reputation is constitutionally protected under Article 21, and that the criminal-defamation framework, properly construed, does not produce an undue chilling effect on expression. A digest of the holding, the doctrinal architecture, and the contemporary practitioner's framework.