A branch falling from an old roadside tree onto a sheltering autorickshaw was an unforeseeable Act of God, and the injury did not arise from the vehicle's 'use' in the proximate sense Section 166 requires — yet the Supreme Court still enhanced compensation under Article 142.
The Supreme Court settled a long-inconsistent question of motor accident law — which years' Income Tax Returns fix a deceased's annual income under Section 166 — by bifurcating the rule for salaried and self-employed claimants.
The Supreme Court enhanced a carpenter's motor-accident compensation to ₹35,95,923, holding that a skilled artisan's notional income cannot be pegged to minimum wages, that functional disability (100%) — not the 70% medical figure — governs loss of earning capacity, and that future prosthetic-limb costs must be quantified over the injured's lifetime.
In an amputee's claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, the Supreme Court held that compensation for loss of earning capacity turns on functional disability — the real reduction in earning power in the claimant's vocation — not the percentage of physical disability certified by a medical board. It also reaffirmed that income-tax returns are cogent proof of pre-accident income and cannot be brushed aside on surmises.
The Supreme Court held that there is no bar on a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal or appellate court awarding compensation greater than the sum claimed. The statutory duty under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to award just compensation, subject only to the claimant paying court fee on the enhanced amount.
The Supreme Court held that the addition for future prospects cannot be refused merely because the victim's income was notional rather than proved. Applying the Pranay Sethi percentages to a homemaker's notional income, the Court underscored the economic value of domestic work.
The Supreme Court, following Reliance General Insurance v. Shashi Sharma, held that compassionate financial assistance under the Haryana Rules of 2006 — which replicates the deceased employee's pay and wages — must be deducted from the loss-of-income component of a Motor Vehicles Act dependency award, because allowing both would be an impermissible double benefit. Genuinely collateral receipts such as life insurance and family pension remain non-deductible under Helen C. Rebello.
The Supreme Court issued continuing-mandamus directions to make the Compensation of Victims of Hit and Run Motor Accidents Scheme, 2022 actually reach claimants — police must inform victims, file the First Accident Report, and route unfiled cases to legal-aid authorities. The Court also told the Centre to consider raising the ₹2 lakh and ₹50,000 caps.
The Supreme Court used a fatal bus-accident claim to bring order to motor-accident compensation, fixing an age-based multiplier table and standard slabs for deducting the deceased's personal and living expenses. The framework became the bedrock of MACT computation, later affirmed by the Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi.
On 31 October 2017, a five-judge Constitution Bench unanimously settled the methodology for computing 'just compensation' under the Motor Vehicles Act 1988. Authored by Chief Justice Dipak Misra, the judgment fixed the future-prospects framework on bright-line age and employment-status tiers, affirmed the Sarla Verma multiplier line, standardised the conventional heads with a built-in 10 per cent revision every three years, and brought a long period of MACT inconsistency to a close.
On 5 January 2004, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court (V.N. Khare CJI, S.B. Sinha J. authoring, and S.H. Kapadia J.) settled the 'pay and recover' doctrine for motor accident claims involving a driver without a valid licence. The bench held that third-party statutory liability under Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 persists even where the driver had no licence at the time of the accident; that the insurer must pay the third party first and may then recover from the insured under the breach-of-policy condition; that the burden lies on the insurer to prove deliberate breach as a precondition to recovery; and that the owner's contractual liability to the insurer is analytically separate from the insurer's statutory liability to the third party. The judgment installed the victim-protection architecture that runs through every subsequent motor accident decision.
On 19 August 1999, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court (Saghir Ahmad and R.P. Sethi JJ.) held that motor-insurance contracts must be strictly construed; that statutory permit conditions under the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 are read into the insurance contract where the policy expressly so provides; and that carriage of hazardous goods on a permit limited to 'unhazardous goods' takes the loss outside the scope of cover. The District Forum's dismissal of the insured's consumer complaint was restored; the State Commission and NCDRC awards that had overridden the policy terms on equitable grounds were set aside. The judgment is the motor-insurance extension of the Chandumull Jain construction canon and a disciplinary correction of consumer-forum overreach.
On 17 March 2026, a two-judge bench of Justices Pankaj Mithal and Prasanna B. Varale held that amounts received by the dependants of the deceased under employer-provided group insurance — or under other contractual or social-security benefits — cannot be treated as 'pecuniary advantages' liable to be deducted from compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The judgment affirms the prior doctrinal line that advantages accruing from contracts performed during the deceased's lifetime are not outcomes of the death itself, and produces a working frame for the just-compensation architecture in motor-accident claims.
On 17 March 2026, the Competition Commission of India closed a complaint against Roppen Transportation (Rapido) over alleged use of private (white-plate) vehicles in its bike-taxi service. The Commission's reasoning was jurisdictional: the dispute fell within the specialised framework of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and not within the Commission's competition-law jurisdiction. A digest of the order, the jurisdictional doctrine, and what it reveals about the Commission's posture on overlap with sectoral regulation.