ValkyaEditorial
Supreme Court

S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India (2024): operationalising the hit-and-run compensation scheme under s.161 MV Act

The Supreme Court issued continuing-mandamus directions to make the Compensation of Victims of Hit and Run Motor Accidents Scheme, 2022 actually reach claimants — police must inform victims, file the First Accident Report, and route unfiled cases to legal-aid authorities. The Court also told the Centre to consider raising the ₹2 lakh and ₹50,000 caps.

Valkya Editorial· Legal Intelligence··6 min read
Court
Supreme Court of India
Citation
S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India & Ors., 2024 INSC 37 (I.A. in W.P. (C) No. 295 of 2012)
Neutral citation
2024 INSC 37
Bench
Abhay S. Oka, J., Pankaj Mithal, J.
Decided
12 January 2024

When a vehicle kills or maims and then vanishes, the ordinary route to compensation — a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal award against an identified insurer — closes off, because there is no insurer and often no vehicle to sue. For exactly that gap, the Motor Vehicles Act provides a no-fault, State-funded fallback. In S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, decided on 12 January 2024, a Bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Pankaj Mithal found that the fallback existed on paper but was barely reaching the people it was written for, and converted a long-running road-safety writ into a vehicle for continuing-mandamus directions to make the scheme function.

The facts in brief

The proceeding arose from an interlocutory application in Writ Petition (C) No. 295 of 2012, a public-interest matter on road safety in which the Court has periodically monitored the implementation of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The specific subject before the Bench was the Compensation of Victims of Hit and Run Motor Accidents Scheme, 2022, framed by the Central Government under Section 161 of the Act and effective from 1 April 2022. The Scheme fixes compensation of ₹2,00,000 in the case of death and ₹50,000 for grievous hurt where the offending vehicle is not identified, payable from the dedicated fund created under the statutory framework.

The numbers placed before the Court told the story. Over a recent five-year window there had been roughly 660 deaths in hit-and-run cases, yet only a negligible fraction of eligible victims or their legal representatives had ever claimed under the Scheme, with disbursements of only around ₹184 lakh across about 113 injury cases. The structural problem was not eligibility or funding but awareness: the people entitled to claim simply did not know the Scheme existed, and the officials who knew an accident had occurred were not connecting victims to it.

The question

The question was not whether the Scheme was valid — it plainly was — but how the Court could ensure that a properly framed statutory entitlement actually reached the class it was meant to protect. Concretely: what duties lie on the police and the Claims Enquiry Officer once a hit-and-run accident is identified, and what mechanism guarantees that an eligible victim who is unaware of the Scheme is nonetheless put in a position to claim? A subsidiary question was whether the compensation amounts, fixed in 2022, should be periodically revisited so that inflation does not erode the value of the entitlement.

What the Court held

The Court located the failure squarely in implementation rather than design. Officials with first-hand knowledge of an accident were doing nothing to convert that knowledge into a claim.

There are cases where the Police, as well as the Claims Enquiry Officer, are aware of the fact that a hit and run accident has occurred. However, no efforts are made to ensure that the persons entitled to seek compensation file their claims.
Rajaseekaran (2024 INSC 37)

To close that gap, the Bench issued a set of operational directions. Where the police conclude that an incident is a hit-and-run accident, they must inform the victim — or, in a fatal case, the legal representatives — about the availability of the Scheme and assist in filing the claim. The police were directed to forward the First Accident Report (FAR) to the Claims Enquiry Officer within a defined period, and where, despite that, no claim is filed, the matter is to be referred onward so that the District Legal Services Authority can step in and assist the eligible claimant. The directions thread together the police, the claims machinery and the legal-aid network into a single referral chain, so that a victim's ignorance of the Scheme no longer defeats the entitlement.

On the quantum, the Court did not itself rewrite the figures, which is a policy matter for the executive. Instead it directed the Central Government to consider whether the ₹2 lakh and ₹50,000 amounts should be enhanced periodically, recognising that a static figure loses real value over time. The Bench called for compliance reports and kept the matter under its supervision, fixing a follow-up date for review of progress.

Analysis

The judgment is best read as an exercise in continuing mandamus rather than a one-off declaration of rights. The Court did not decide a contested lis between two parties; it audited the working of a welfare scheme and issued enforceable directions to the State machinery, retaining seisin to verify compliance. That technique — familiar from the larger road-safety litigation of which this application is a part — treats the implementation gap itself as the justiciable wrong.

Doctrinally, the case sits at the no-fault end of the motor-accident compensation spectrum. Most of the Court's motor-accident jurisprudence concerns awards against identified insurers — the standardised computation in National Insurance Co. v. Pranay Sethi, or the allocation of liability between insurer and owner under the pay-and-recover principle. The hit-and-run scheme operates where that entire structure is unavailable because the tortfeasor cannot be found, and Section 161 supplies a State-funded substitute. By insisting that this substitute be made known and accessible, Rajaseekaran complements the tribunal-centred line of authority: it ensures that the most vulnerable victims, who cannot even name a defendant, are not left worse off than those who can.

The judgment also reflects the Court's broader Article 21 framing of road safety, visible in matters such as the Phalodi highway-safety proceedings, where the right to life is read to carry positive obligations on the State to make protective machinery effective in practice, not merely to enact it.

Why it matters

For practitioners and legal-aid bodies, the practical takeaway is that hit-and-run compensation is now backed by an affirmative, court-supervised duty to inform and assist, not a passive scheme that claimants must discover for themselves. The FAR mechanism and the referral to the District Legal Services Authority create concrete checkpoints at which a missed claim can be caught, and compliance is being monitored from the apex court. Counsel advising a hit-and-run victim — or a District Legal Services Authority handling a referred case — can point to these directions to demand that the police and Claims Enquiry Officer perform their notification and filing duties.

More broadly, the decision illustrates how the Supreme Court polices the distance between a beneficial statutory entitlement and its delivery on the ground. Framing a scheme under Section 161 is only the first step; the value of the entitlement depends on victims knowing it exists, on the amounts keeping pace with inflation, and on an institutional chain that carries an eligible claim from the accident site to disbursement. Rajaseekaran is a reminder that, for road-accident victims at the margins, the law's promise is only as good as its administration.

Sources

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