On 12 May 2026, a two-judge bench expunged findings of cruelty and desertion against a dentist wife who had relocated from Kargil to Ahmedabad for tertiary medical care and to pursue her practice, holding that 'marriage does not eclipse her individuality' and retaining the divorce decree on the ground of irretrievable breakdown under Article 142.
On 15 May 2026, a two-judge bench held that Section 6(5) of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 is a narrow saving clause that protects pre-20 December 2004 partitions from the retroactive coparcenary amendment of 2005, but does not bar a partition suit and does not displace daughters' independent Section 8 rights — which accrued on the intestate's death and pre-existed the 2005 amendment. An oral partition among sons alone cannot defeat the daughters' succession share, and a second Order VII Rule 11 CPC application on identical grounds is barred by res judicata.
On 21 April 2026, the Supreme Court held that a rejection of a jurisdictional plea under section 16 of the Arbitration Act is not an interim award and cannot be challenged under section 34 until the final award is rendered.
On 22 April 2026, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory bail conditions under section 480(3) BNSS apply only to non-bailable offences punishable with imprisonment of seven years or more, correcting widespread trial-court template practice.
On 27 May 2026 a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court — Chief Justice Surya Kant with Justice Joymalya Bagchi — upheld the Election Commission's Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls across Bihar and West Bengal and refused to interdict the ongoing roll-revision exercise in Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat and Rajasthan. The Court held the SIR validly grounded in Article 324 read with the Representation of the People Act 1950 and the 1960 Rules, drew a doctrinal boundary between the Commission's electoral-roll citizenship inquiry and a Citizenship Act determination, and directed the Commission to forward to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs within four weeks the names of voters deleted on doubtful-citizenship grounds. A close reading of the ruling, its anchor in Mohinder Singh Gill and its place in the 2026-27 electoral cycle.
On 8 November 2024 a seven-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, by a 4:3 majority, overruled the 1968 ruling in S. Azeez Basha v. Union of India that an institution incorporated by statute could never be a minority institution under Article 30(1). The majority, authored by Chandrachud CJ on behalf of himself and Justices Sanjiv Khanna, Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, held that statutory incorporation does not extinguish minority status — what matters is whether the minority community established the institution in substance, traced through ideation, purpose and implementation; and that the conjunctive 'establish and administer' formula in Article 30(1) permits proportionate, not exclusive, minority administration. Three separate dissents — by Surya Kant J, Datta J and S.C. Sharma J — would have preserved Azeez Basha. The question of whether AMU as it exists today satisfies the new establishment test was remitted to a regular bench.
On 10 April 2008, a five-judge Constitution Bench upheld the Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act 2006 — providing 27% OBC reservation in centrally-funded higher education institutions including the IITs, IIMs, AIIMS and central universities — together with the 93rd Constitutional Amendment that inserted Article 15(5). The Bench extended the Indra Sawhney creamy-layer doctrine to OBC reservation in higher education, preserved the 50% reservation ceiling and required periodic review and quantifiable data. The validity of Article 15(5) for private unaided institutions was left for Pramati (2014) to settle.
The Supreme Court's April 2026 ruling on the conjunctive 'or' in *Rule 69(1)(c)* of the CCS (Pension) Rules 1972. A 2-judge bench held that the embargo on the release of gratuity operates for the entire duration during which either departmental or judicial proceedings remain pending against a retired employee — and the embargo persists until both sets of proceedings conclude. Exoneration in the departmental proceeding does not lift the bar where a criminal trial on the same allegations remains pending. The doctrinal line draws a sharp separation from *Jaswant Singh Gill v. Bharat Coking Coal* (2007) on the *Payment of Gratuity Act 1972* and is to be read alongside *Kadir Khan Ahmed Khan Pathan v. MSWC* (2026 INSC 16) as a 2026 SC pair on the post-retirement disciplinary architecture.
On 27 February 2009 a three-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that neither the RDDBFI Act 1993 nor the SARFAESI Act 2002 contained any express provision giving the secured creditor priority over the State's statutory first charge for sales-tax or excise dues. The non-obstante clauses in Section 34(1) RDDBFI and Section 35 SARFAESI did not, by implication, displace specific statutory first charges in State revenue legislation. The State's first charge prevailed. The decision drove the 2016 Amendment Act, which inserted Section 31B RDDBFI and Section 26E SARFAESI and reversed the priority position for registered secured creditors prospectively.
The constitutional status of the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test for medical and dental admissions was decided three times over seven years. On 18 July 2013, a three-judge bench led by Chief Justice Altamas Kabir struck down the NEET notifications by a 2:1 majority — Justice A.R. Dave dissenting — holding that MCI and DCI lacked statutory power to prescribe a uniform entrance test for private unaided minority institutions. On 11 April 2016, a five-judge Constitution Bench recalled the 2013 judgment for inadequate deliberation. On 29 April 2020, a three-judge bench of Justices Arun Mishra, Vineet Saran and M.R. Shah overruled the 2013 ruling and upheld NEET as a mandatory common entrance examination across all medical and dental institutions in India, including private unaided minority institutions. A close reading of the 2013 majority and dissent, the 2016 recall, the 2020 operative holding, the distinction between entrance examination and admission decision that preserves minority autonomy within the NEET-qualified pool, and the downstream Neil Aurelio Nunes arc on OBC and EWS reservation in NEET-PG.
On 7 February 1966, a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court (Hidayatullah J. authoring, with Gajendragadkar CJ, Wanchoo, V. Ramaswami and Satyanarayanaraju JJ.) settled the foundational canon of Indian insurance-contract interpretation: the court's task is to interpret the words in which the parties have expressed their contract — not to make a new contract, however reasonable, that the parties have not made themselves. A cover note issued 'subject to the usual conditions of the Society's policies' incorporates the full policy framework, including a termination clause, even before the formal policy issues. The judgment is the strict-construction landmark; supporting principles of uberrimae fidei and contra proferentem read alongside but trace their foundational SC authority to Mithoolal Nayak v. LIC (1962) for the disclosure duty. Sixty years on, every Indian insurance-contract dispute begins from the Chandumull Jain canon.
On 21 April 2014 a three-judge bench of Justices A.K. Patnaik, Surinder Singh Nijjar and Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla — with Patnaik J. pronouncing judgment — held that every iron-ore and manganese-ore mining lease in Goa had, in its renewed avatar, expired on 22 November 2007; that every mining operation thereafter was illegal; that the State's 'second renewal' orders had no statutory basis; and, drawing on the Justice M.B. Shah Commission Report, translated inter-generational equity into a financial mechanism by capping iron-ore excavation at 20 million MT a year, mandating e-auction of inventorised ores, and constituting the Goan Iron Ore Permanent Fund under Court supervision.
On 29 March 2019 a two-judge bench of Justices D.Y. Chandrachud and Hemant Gupta suspended — not outright quashed — the 28 October 2015 environmental clearance for the Mopa greenfield airport in Goa, and remitted the matter to the Expert Appraisal Committee for re-examination within a month, on a record that disclosed non-disclosure in Form-1 of ecologically sensitive markers, an inadequate cumulative-impact assessment, and faunal markers including the South Asian river dolphin that the EAC's recommendation had not engaged. A practitioner's read on the duty of candour, the EIA rigour standard, and the suspension-for-re-examination remedial template.
On 7 November 1975, a five-judge Constitution Bench unanimously struck down Clause (4) of Article 329A — the Thirty-ninth Amendment's attempt to retroactively withdraw the Prime Minister's election from judicial scrutiny — as a violation of the basic structure. On the merits, the Court reversed the Allahabad High Court and upheld Mrs Gandhi's Rae Bareli election, but on statutory grounds: the retroactive amendments to the Representation of the People Act had taken the very corrupt-practice findings out from under Sinha J's judgment. The judgment installed free and fair elections, judicial review of election disputes and the rule of law as basic-structure components.
A 2-judge bench of the Supreme Court — *Altamas Kabir, J.* and *Cyriac Joseph, J.* — held on 16 July 2009 that the Debts Recovery Tribunal's jurisdiction under *Section 17* of the *SARFAESI Act 2002* is not confined to the moment a *Section 13(4)* measure is taken; it extends to every action by the secured creditor in furtherance of *Section 13(4)*, including post-possession sale, sale confirmation and consequential steps. The DRT may scrutinise such actions on substantive grounds, set them aside, and — where illegality is established — restore the status quo ante. The decision is the foundational authority on the substantive (rather than merely supervisory) character of *Section 17* review.
On 18 February 1992, a five-judge Constitution Bench upheld the Tenth Schedule's constitutional validity by a 3:2 majority but struck down Paragraph 7 — the absolute finality clause — for want of ratification under the proviso to Article 368(2). The majority held that the Speaker, when adjudicating disqualification under the Tenth Schedule, acts as a Tribunal whose decisions are subject to limited judicial review under Articles 136, 226 and 227 on grounds of jurisdictional error, mala fides, perversity, violation of constitutional mandates and breach of natural justice — ordinarily only after the final order. Sharma and Verma JJ dissented in part on severability.
On 5 February 2015 a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court — Dipak Misra and Prafulla Pant JJ., the principal opinion authored by Dipak Misra J. — held that a candidate's non-disclosure of pending criminal cases in the Form 26 nomination affidavit, where charges have been framed or cognizance has been taken, amounts to 'undue influence' within Section 123(2) of the Representation of the People Act 1951 and is therefore a corrupt practice rendering the election liable to be set aside under Section 100(1)(b). The judgment elevates ECI Form 26 disclosure to constitutional and statutory significance and extends the framework to local-body elections.
On 13 December 2000, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court — Justice D.P. Mohapatra authoring, with Chief Justice B.N. Kirpal on the panel — set out the foundational architecture for repudiation of a life-insurance policy under the second part of Section 45 of the Insurance Act 1938. The judgment held that after the two-year incontestability window, an insurer can repudiate only by establishing cumulatively that the impugned statement was on a material matter, that the suppression was fraudulent, and that the policyholder knew at the time of making the statement that it was false. The burden is a heavy one; mere inaccuracy is not enough.
On 22 July 1992, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court (A.M. Ahmadi J. authoring, with M.M. Punchhi J. concurring) held that the Life Insurance Corporation is 'State' within Article 12 of the Constitution and is bound by Part III fundamental rights; that the right of reply — the right of a citizen to use the same forum that has carried criticism of his work to publish a rejoinder — is integral to the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a); and that non-statutory administrative guidelines cannot ground a restriction on speech under Article 19(2). The companion appeal concerning Tapan Bose's documentary 'Beyond Genocide' on the Bhopal gas disaster applied the same framework to Doordarshan. The judgment is the doctrinal bridge between Sukhdev Singh's Article 12 jurisprudence and the broadcasting-access cases that culminated in Cricket Association of Bengal.
On 28 April 2026 the Supreme Court — Justices P.S. Narasimha and Alok Aradhe — dismissed the appeal of Lucknow Public School, Eldico, which had refused admission to a child from a disadvantaged group duly allotted by the State Government under Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act and the UP RTE Rules 2011 for the 2024-25 pre-primary year on the school's plea of 'uncertainty' about eligibility. The ruling holds that once a State authority allots a child under the RTE scheme, the neighbourhood school's duty to admit is mandatory and immediate; the school cannot interpose its own eligibility scrutiny or procedural conditions; and any refusal or delay is unlawful. The Bench characterised the 25% RTE reservation as a 'national mission' rooted in Article 21A, hardening the operational architecture that Society for Unaided Private Schools v. Union of India (2012) had set in motion.
On 27 August 2014 a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court — Lodha CJ, Dipak Misra, Lokur, Kurian Joseph and Bobde JJ., the principal opinion authored by Dipak Misra J. — declined to read an implied disqualification into Article 75(1) prohibiting the Prime Minister from advising the appointment of persons facing serious criminal charges. Where the Constitution had prescribed no bar, the Court held, judicial mandamus could not constrict the Prime Minister's discretion. The Bench held, instead, that the Prime Minister was under a 'constitutional expectation' — emanating from constitutional morality, good governance and the trust reposed in high constitutional office — not to recommend the appointment of persons against whom charges had been framed for heinous or serious offences. The judgment is the analytical seedbed of the constitutional-morality strand in modern Indian constitutional adjudication.
On 8 April 2004 a three-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 while striking down its Section 17(2) requirement that a borrower deposit 75% of the demand before access to the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The Bench also read into Section 13(3) a duty on the secured creditor to communicate, in writing, the reasons for non-acceptance of the borrower's representation — a safeguard that Parliament codified within months as Section 13(3A) by the 2004 Amendment Act.
On 2 May 2016, a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court — in a judgment authored by Justice A.K. Sikri — upheld the Madhya Pradesh Niji Vyavsayik Shikshan Sanstha (Pravesh Ka Viniyaman Avam Shulk Ka Nirdharan) Adhiniyam 2007, which subjected private unaided professional educational institutions to State regulation over admissions, fee fixation, reservation and eligibility criteria. The Bench formally articulated and applied the four-prong proportionality test — legitimate aim, suitability, necessity and balancing — as the working standard for assessing reasonableness of restrictions under Article 19(6) on the Article 19(1)(g) right of educational institutions. A close reading of Sikri J's reasoning, the post-T.M.A. Pai and Inamdar regulatory architecture, education as a noble occupation, the proportionality test's doctrinal afterlife in Puttaswamy, Aadhaar and Anuradha Bhasin, and the regulatory framework that NEET would inherit in CMC Vellore (2020).
On 2 December 1977, a five-judge Constitution Bench held that Article 324 vests the Election Commission of India with plenary and residuary powers wherever statute or rules are silent, but that those powers must be exercised consistently with natural justice and on reasons stated when the order is made — not on reasons supplied later by affidavit. The judgment also reaffirmed that Article 329(b) bars judicial interference with the election process between notification and declaration, leaving the election petition as the sole post-result remedy.
On 31 October 2017, a five-judge Constitution Bench unanimously settled the methodology for computing 'just compensation' under the Motor Vehicles Act 1988. Authored by Chief Justice Dipak Misra, the judgment fixed the future-prospects framework on bright-line age and employment-status tiers, affirmed the Sarla Verma multiplier line, standardised the conventional heads with a built-in 10 per cent revision every three years, and brought a long period of MACT inconsistency to a close.
On 5 January 2004, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court (V.N. Khare CJI, S.B. Sinha J. authoring, and S.H. Kapadia J.) settled the 'pay and recover' doctrine for motor accident claims involving a driver without a valid licence. The bench held that third-party statutory liability under Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 persists even where the driver had no licence at the time of the accident; that the insurer must pay the third party first and may then recover from the insured under the breach-of-policy condition; that the burden lies on the insurer to prove deliberate breach as a precondition to recovery; and that the owner's contractual liability to the insurer is analytically separate from the insurer's statutory liability to the third party. The judgment installed the victim-protection architecture that runs through every subsequent motor accident decision.
On 19 August 1999, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court (Saghir Ahmad and R.P. Sethi JJ.) held that motor-insurance contracts must be strictly construed; that statutory permit conditions under the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 are read into the insurance contract where the policy expressly so provides; and that carriage of hazardous goods on a permit limited to 'unhazardous goods' takes the loss outside the scope of cover. The District Forum's dismissal of the insured's consumer complaint was restored; the State Commission and NCDRC awards that had overridden the policy terms on equitable grounds were set aside. The judgment is the motor-insurance extension of the Chandumull Jain construction canon and a disciplinary correction of consumer-forum overreach.
On 22 June 1984, a three-judge bench of Justice P.N. Bhagwati, Justice A.N. Sen and Justice Ranganath Misra held that wholesale state-domicile reservation in MBBS admissions is unconstitutional under Article 14 — every Indian citizen has only one domicile, the territory of India under Article 5. Institutional preference for graduates of the same institution was preserved as qualitatively distinct from domicile reservation; PG specialty admissions were directed to be on all-India merit. Saurabh Chaudri (2003) raised the all-India PG quota to 50% and Dr Tanvi Behl (2025) reaffirmed the framework against Chandigarh's UT-resident quota.
On 6 May 2014, a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court — in a unanimous judgment authored by Justice A.K. Patnaik — upheld both the 86th Constitutional Amendment Act 2002 (inserting Article 21A) and the 93rd Constitutional Amendment Act 2005 (inserting Article 15(5)). The Bench held that the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2009 and the special-provisions power under Article 15(5) do not apply to minority educational institutions, whether aided or unaided. Read with Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India (2012) — which had already carved out the minority unaided exemption — Pramati completes a two-step minority exemption from the post-Article 21A reservation architecture. A close reading of Patnaik J's reasoning on basic structure, the Article 30(1) minority autonomy core, the relationship with T.M.A. Pai and Inamdar, the legislative reversal of Inamdar's holding on private unaided reservation, and the live September 2025 reference questioning the Pramati exemption.
On 25 September 2018 a five-judge Constitution Bench led by Chief Justice Dipak Misra — Misra CJ, Nariman, Khanwilkar, Chandrachud and Indu Malhotra JJ. — declined to judicially bar persons against whom charges had been framed from contesting elections, holding that the disqualification regime under Articles 102 and 191 read with Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act 1951 is exhaustive and that only Parliament can add. The Bench instead issued five binding directions on Form 26 disclosure, party-website publication and three-times newspaper-and-electronic-media publicity post-nomination, and urged Parliament to legislate decriminalisation. The framework was extended in Rambabu Singh Thakur (2020) — 48-hour publication and selection-reasons requirement — and enforced through contempt in Brajesh Singh (2021).
On 13 March 2003, a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court struck down Section 33B of the Representation of the People Act 1951 — inserted by the 2002 Amendment to neutralise the Court's direction in ADR (2002) — as unconstitutional and violative of Article 19(1)(a). The Court reaffirmed that the voter's right to know the criminal antecedents, assets, liabilities and educational qualifications of candidates is part of the freedom of speech and expression, and read down Section 33A as supplementing — not supplanting — the wider disclosure regime articulated by the Court and the Election Commission. Justice Dharmadhikari concurred in part and dissented in part.
On 16 December 2015 a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court rejected the Reserve Bank of India's standing defence that its inspection reports, willful-defaulter lists and supervisory communications with banks were protected from disclosure under Section 8(1)(e) of the Right to Information Act 2005 as fiduciary information. The judgment is the foundational Indian authority on regulator–regulated transparency and continues to shape RTI practice into the DPDP era.
On 24 April 2019, a two-judge bench of Justices Dr D.Y. Chandrachud and Hemant Gupta restored an insurer's repudiation of a life policy because the proposer had failed to disclose an existing Rs.11 lakh Max New York Life policy taken nine weeks earlier. The judgment, authored by Chandrachud J, holds that the existence of prior policies is a material fact bearing on aggregate risk concentration; because death and repudiation both fell within the two-year window, the pre-2015 second proviso to Section 45 of the Insurance Act 1938 had not yet attached, and the insurer needed only to establish materiality — not fraud.
On 10 July 2009, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court — Justice D.K. Jain authoring, with Justice R.M. Lodha on the panel — imported the English 'prudent insurer' test of materiality into Indian mediclaim jurisprudence and crystallised the insured's positive duty of disclosure at the proposal stage. The judgment held that a mediclaim policy is a contract of uberrimae fidei, that the insured is bound to disclose health conditions material to the risk regardless of whether the proposal form asks the specific question, and that consumer forums cannot override the uberrimae fidei architecture to reach equity outcomes.
The Supreme Court's first major pronouncement on the 2024 RBI Master Directions on Fraud Risk Management. A 2-judge bench held three things: there is no inherent right to a personal or oral hearing before fraud classification because the determination is grounded in objective documentary evidence and a written show-cause-and-reply procedure satisfies natural justice; banks must furnish the full Forensic Audit Report to the borrower as the rule, with only narrow exceptions for genuinely third-party sensitive material; and the doctrinal distinction between fraud — which carries criminality — and wilful default — which does not — justifies the differentiated procedural protections under the two regulatory regimes.
A 2-judge bench of the Supreme Court — *Dr D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.* and *Hima Kohli, J.* — held in March 2023 that the principle of audi alteram partem must be read into Clauses 8.9.4 and 8.9.5 of the *Reserve Bank of India (Frauds Classification and Reporting by Commercial Banks and Select FIs) Directions 2016*. Classification of a borrower's account as 'fraud' by a Joint Lenders' Forum carries the consequences of civil death — credit-access debarment, reputational harm, director-disqualification fallout — and engages Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21. The borrower is entitled to notice, to supply of the forensic audit report (or its conclusions), to an opportunity to be heard and to a reasoned order before classification. No prior hearing is required before the lodging of an FIR under *Section 154* of the *Code of Criminal Procedure*, which is a separate criminal-law step.
On 17 February 2020, a two-judge Bench of Justices D.Y. Chandrachud and Ajay Rastogi held that the Ministry of Defence policy denying Short Service Commission women officers Permanent Commission in non-combat arms of the Indian Army — Army Service Corps, Ordnance Corps, EME, Signals, Intelligence Corps, AEC, JAG and the other streams in which women had been inducted as SSC officers — violates Articles 14, 15 and 16. The Court rejected the Centre's submissions about 'physiological limitations', 'domestic obligations' and unit cohesion as constitutionally impermissible gender stereotypes, set aside the 'staff appointments only' restriction in the 25 February 2019 policy letter, and directed that all serving SSC women officers be considered for Permanent Commission on terms equivalent to male officers with consequential entitlements. *Babita Puniya* installed the anti-stereotype framework that *Annie Nagaraja* (Navy) and *Lt Col Nitisha* (indirect discrimination) elaborated, and that *Lt Col Pooja Pal* (2026) operationalised through Article 142 structural compensatory relief.
A 2-judge bench of the Supreme Court reversed a Karnataka High Court order that had set aside a SARFAESI auction sale and upheld the sale in favour of the bank. Rule 9(1) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules 2002 — the 30-day publication-to-sale window — is mandatory but, being 'definitely for the benefit of the borrower', is waivable by the borrower's conduct or written consent. A borrower's letter consenting to extension of time is a valid waiver. The decision separately reinforces United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon (2010) on writ self-restraint: where Section 17 SARFAESI supplies an efficacious DRT remedy, the High Court ought not to entertain an Article 226 writ.
On 12 April 2012, a 2:1 majority of the Supreme Court — Chief Justice S.H. Kapadia and Justice Swatanter Kumar — upheld the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2009, including the Section 12(1)(c) mandate that all recognised schools reserve 25% of Class I seats for children from disadvantaged groups and weaker sections. The majority itself carved out the exemption for private unaided minority schools, on the reasoning that the mandate would impair the Article 30(1) right. Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan dissented. The two-step minority exemption began here; Pramati (2014) completed it for aided minority schools.
On 6 December 1991, a 4:1 Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that minority educational institutions — aided or unaided — retain the right under Article 30(1) to admit students of their own community on a preferential basis up to approximately 50% of seats, with the remainder filled by merit from the general pool. Justice Jagannatha Shetty's majority harmonised Article 29(2) with Article 30(1); Justice Kasliwal dissented. T.M.A. Pai (2002) later calibrated the rigid 50% cap institution-by-institution but left the autonomy floor intact.
On 10 April 2006, a five-judge Constitution Bench led by Sabharwal CJ and authored by Balasubramanyan J held that public employment must follow Article 16 — competitive, advertised, merit-based recruitment to sanctioned posts — and that temporary, casual, daily-wage, ad hoc or contractual appointees made outside that scheme acquire no fundamental right to regularisation however long they may have served. The judgment drew a sharp doctrinal line between 'irregular' and 'illegal' appointments, granted a one-time, fixed-date paragraph-53 exception for irregular appointees who had completed ten years of service on sanctioned posts as of 10 April 2006, and overruled *Dharwad PWD*, *Daily Rated Casual Labour v. Union of India* and *Ashwani Kumar v. State of Bihar*. The decision remains the gravitational centre of Indian regularisation jurisprudence two decades on.
The Supreme Court's April 2026 ruling that the right to dearness allowance, once incorporated into a state's statutory pay rules through a specific AICPI-linked mechanism, becomes a legally enforceable right that the executive cannot displace by memorandum — regardless of the state's financial constraints. Financial inability is not a defence to a statutory pay mechanism; executive economic policy cannot derogate from a statutory pay framework. The reasoning consolidates the doctrinal line that statutory pay mechanisms in public employment have the force of law, not the malleability of executive instruction.
On 11 May 2023 a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court unanimously delivered Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra — the apex court's most consequential Tenth Schedule ruling since Kihoto Hollohan. The Court held the Governor's 30 June 2022 floor-test call unjustified, declined to restore the Thackeray Government because of Uddhav Thackeray's voluntary resignation, struck down the Speaker's recognition of a rival whip on the principle that the whip is appointed by the political party and not the legislature party, and referred Nabam Rebia to a seven-judge bench. A close reading of the architecture, the doctrinal lines, and the unfinished business.
On 6 May 2014, a five-judge Constitution Bench led by Chief Justice R.M. Lodha struck down Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 1946 — the statutory revival of the executive 'Single Directive' that this Court had abrogated in Vineet Narain (1998) — as violative of Article 14. The judgment closes the doctrinal arc: an administrative immunity, struck down in 1997-98, cannot be reintroduced in legislative form when the underlying constitutional defect remains. The decision became the analytical scaffold for CBI v. R.R. Kishore (2023) and frames the still-pending challenge to Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 inserted by the 2018 amendment.
On 21 February 1975, a five-judge Constitution Bench held that statutory corporations created by Acts of Parliament — ONGC, LIC and IFCI in the consolidated appeals — are 'authorities' within Article 12, that regulations framed by such corporations under their enabling statutes have the force of law and bind both employer and employee as more than mere contract, and that public-sector dismissals made in breach of those statutory regulations are void, entitling the employee to reinstatement. Justice K.K. Mathew's concurring opinion laid the foundations of the 'instrumentality of State' doctrine that was elaborated in *R.D. Shetty* (1979) and *Ajay Hasia* (1981), and refined by the 7-judge Bench in *Pradeep Kumar Biswas* (2002). *Sukhdev Singh* remains the backbone of Indian public-employment jurisprudence.
A 2-judge bench of the Supreme Court — *J.S. Verma, J.* and *K. Jayachandra Reddy, J.* — held in March 1992 that a bank has a general lien on fixed deposit receipts in its possession under *Section 171* of the *Indian Contract Act 1872*, supplemented by the contractual right to set-off, and that an FDR deposited under a covering letter authorising retention 'so long as any amount is due' cannot be attached by a third-party decree-holder ahead of the bank's lien. The judgment distinguished the general lien from the particular lien under *Section 170* and is the foundational authority for the banker-customer set-off architecture in India.
On 29 November 2006, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that the SARFAESI Act 2002 and the RDDBFI Act 1993 are complementary, not mutually exclusive: a secured creditor may simultaneously prosecute a Debts Recovery Tribunal Original Application under Section 19 of the 1993 Act and a Section 13 SARFAESI enforcement without first withdrawing the OA. The doctrine of election does not apply. The first proviso to Section 19(1) of the 1993 Act does not require withdrawal as a condition precedent — the Section 13(2) notice is a show-cause step, not 'action' within the meaning of the proviso. Section 13(4) 'possession' extends to physical possession.
The Supreme Court's foundational decision on the doctrinal limits of compassionate appointment in public employment. A 2-judge bench held that compassionate appointment is not a constitutional or fundamental right but a narrow exception to the *Article 16* rule, designed to provide immediate financial relief to the family of a deceased employee — not to bestow the deceased's post as an 'heirloom' on his progeny. The judgment installed the junior-most-post discipline, the financial-condition examination, the reasonable-time requirement, and a clear limit on judicial direction outside the rules. Thirty years on, the *Sawant J* framework remains the operative anchor of compassionate-appointment jurisprudence, read together with *Canara Bank v. M. Mahesh Kumar* (2015), *Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K.* (2025), and the post-*Umadevi* (2006) regularisation discipline.
On 26 July 2010 a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that the High Court should not ordinarily entertain a writ petition under Article 226 challenging measures taken under the SARFAESI Act 2002 where the borrower has an efficacious statutory remedy before the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17. The alternative-remedy rule is self-imposed judicial restraint, applied with 'greater rigour' in tax, cess and bank-recovery matters. The Bench castigated the routine grant of interim relief in such writ petitions and held that the High Court was 'wholly unjustified' in entertaining the writ at the Section 13(4) stage.
On 5 May 2026 a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court, in Alpha Corp Development Pvt Ltd v. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority, authorised the lifting of the corporate veil during the CIRP of a holding company so that the land assets held by its SPV subsidiaries — which had been used by the group to shield real-estate landbanks from homebuyer claims — could be drawn into the resolution estate. Decided on the factual matrix of the Earth Infrastructures group and producing relief for over 4,200 homebuyers, the ruling is the first clear apex pronouncement that the corporate-separateness principle can be lifted in real-estate insolvencies where the multi-SPV structure has been used to defeat the substantive resolution objective. A close reading of the bench's reasoning, the Article 142 architecture, and what the ruling means for SPV-structured developers, homebuyer associations, and the 2026 RERA-IBC recalibration.
On 10 January 2020, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court led by Justice N.V. Ramana — hearing challenges to the communications shutdown imposed on Jammu and Kashmir after the August 2019 abrogation of Article 370 — held that the freedom of speech and the freedom to practise trade and profession over the internet are protected under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution; that restrictions on those freedoms must satisfy a four-step proportionality test imported from Puttaswamy; that suspension orders under the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services Rules 2017 must be published and subjected to mandatory periodic review; and that Section 144 CrPC cannot be deployed to suppress legitimate dissent. The companion judgment in Ghulam Nabi Azad v. Union of India laid down the operative directions on Section 144.
The May 2026 cycle in Indian arbitration law has produced three doctrinal threads running in parallel — the first substantial post-Gayatri Balasamy applications of the Section 34 limited-modification corridor (Bhupesh Bhayana, Gujarat Water Supply, Paramount Learning), the continuing stamping discipline post-In Re Interplay (Tarini Prasad Mohanty), and the Section 9 reset for the unsuccessful party at the post-award stage (Home Care Retail Marts). Read alongside the Section 12(5) appointment discipline (PTC Techno, Andhra Pradesh v. Dataevolve), the Cox & Kings group-of-companies extension (ASF Buildtech, Ocean View Properties), the limitation question (West Bengal v. B.B.M.), and the institutional developments (CIAC launch, IIAC empanelment suspension, pending 2024 Amendment Bill), the cycle discloses the operational architecture within which Indian arbitration practice now operates.
On 24 August 2020 a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court — Justices D.Y. Chandrachud and K.M. Joseph — held that DLF's failure to hand over possession of flats in 'Westend Heights', Begur, Bengaluru, within the contractual 36-month period constituted 'deficiency in service' under the Consumer Protection Act 1986; that flat-buyers were not confined to the meagre Rs 5 per square foot per month delay-compensation cap in the one-sided Apartment Buyer's Agreement; that the consumer forum could award just and reasonable compensation; and that 6% per annum simple interest on the entire amount paid was awardable in addition to the contractual delay compensation. The judgment crystallised the one-sided clause doctrine months before its formal articulation in IREO Grace Realtech (January 2021).
On 7 October 2003, a two-judge bench of Justices Ruma Pal and B.N. Srikrishna reversed the Delhi High Court and upheld CBDT Circular No. 789 of 13 April 2000 — which had directed assessing officers to treat a Tax Residency Certificate issued by Mauritian authorities as sufficient evidence of residence and beneficial ownership for the purposes of the India–Mauritius Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement. The bench held that treaty shopping is not per se illegal in the absence of an express limitation-of-benefits clause, that the CBDT acted within its Section 119 power, and that Chinnappa Reddy J.'s anti-avoidance observations in McDowell (1985) were obiter and did not displace the Westminster principle in Indian law. A digest of the bench, the architecture of the DTAA, the doctrinal contribution, and the post-judgment arc through the 2016 Protocol, GAAR, and Tiger Global.
On 6 September 2012, a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court overruled Bhatia International and Venture Global and held that Part I of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 applies only to arbitrations seated in India. The judgment prospectively rewrote the boundary between domestic-court supervision and party-chosen foreign seats, aligned Indian law with the UNCITRAL Model Law and the New York Convention, and laid the analytical scaffolding on which Indus Mobile, BGS SGS Soma JV and PASL Wind Solutions were later built.
On 23 July 2019 a two-judge bench of Arun Mishra and U.U. Lalit, JJ. delivered the 270-page Amrapali judgment in exercise of plenary writ jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution. Acting on the findings of a court-ordered Forensic Audit Report, the Court cancelled the Amrapali Group's RERA registration, cancelled the Noida and Greater Noida lease deeds, appointed NBCC (India) Ltd at an 8% commission to complete the stalled projects, appointed Senior Advocate R. Venkataramani as Court Receiver, directed the Enforcement Directorate to investigate offences under FEMA and PMLA, and ordered ICAI disciplinary action against the statutory auditor. Dues recoverable from the authorities and banks were ringfenced to attached promoter assets and were held not to be a charge on the homebuyers or the projects.
On 15 April 2011, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court — Justice R.V. Raveendran writing — supplied the first authoritative analytical framework for arbitrability under the 1996 Act. The judgment installed the in rem / in personam taxonomy, enumerated six classic non-arbitrable categories, and held that a suit for enforcement of a mortgage by sale under Section 67 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 is non-arbitrable. Booz Allen is the foundational anchor on which Vidya Drolia's four-fold test and Cox & Kings's group-of-companies doctrine were later built.
On 15 April 2026, a two-judge bench of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan held that a bank receiving cheques for collection acts as an agent of the customer and is bound to present the instruments within the validity period; the failure to do so — resulting in the cheques becoming stale, without a reasonable explanation — constitutes deficiency in service under the Consumer Protection Act. The Court moderated the compensation, reducing the consumer-commission award from 10 per cent to 6 per cent of the cheque amount with 6 per cent interest. A digest of the holding and the doctrinal architecture for banking-agent liability.
On 9 January 2025, a two-judge bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan clarified the relationship between the Debt Recovery Tribunal's jurisdiction under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act and the civil courts' residual jurisdiction over questions of title, partition, and the validity of pre-enforcement deeds. The judgment holds that the DRT's exclusive jurisdiction extends to the legality of Section 13(4) measures — and no further. Questions of ownership and the validity of deeds predating the bank's enforcement remain triable by civil courts under Section 9 of the CPC.
On 15 December 2016, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court — Madan B. Lokur, J. (authoring), R.K. Agrawal, J. and Dr D.Y. Chandrachud, J. — held that a two-tier arbitration clause, providing for first-tier arbitration in India and an appellate second-tier ICC arbitration in London, is valid and permissible under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. The bench resolved a decade-long impasse left by a 2006 two-judge split between Sinha J. and Tarun Chatterjee J., and reaffirmed party autonomy as the lodestar of the 1996 Act. A close reading of the bench, the contract, the doctrinal contribution on appellate arbitration, and the post-judgment arc through Centrotrade III (June 2020) which held the resulting foreign award enforceable under Part II.
On 15 September 2014, a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court — R.M. Lodha C.J., J.S. Khehar J., J. Chelameswar J., A.K. Sikri J. and R.F. Nariman J. — unanimously held that the proviso to Section 113 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, imposing a surcharge on tax computed in block assessments and inserted by the Finance Act 2002 with effect from 1 June 2002, operates prospectively only and does not apply to block periods ending before that date; the bench overruled the contrary view in CIT v. Suresh N. Gupta (2008) that had treated the proviso as clarificatory. The judgment is the modern leading authority on the presumption against retrospective operation of tax statutes — particularly statutes that levy a new tax, increase a rate, or impose a surcharge. A digest of the bench, the statutory architecture, the doctrinal contribution on the substantive–clarificatory distinction, and the post-judgment arc through Sankaracharya University (2023) and the GST retrospective-amendment challenges now mounting in High Courts.
On 15 November 2019 a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court delivered the most consequential IBC judgment of the post-*Swiss Ribbons* era. The Bench held that the Committee of Creditors' commercial wisdom on the distribution of resolution-plan proceeds — including unequal treatment of financial and operational creditors — is paramount; that the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal had erred in directing equal pro-rata distribution; that the *Section 53* waterfall is a guide but the CoC retains discretion subject to the *Section 30(2)(b)* minimum-liquidation-value floor; that the 'mandatorily' in the amended *Section 12* 330-day proviso is to be read down as directory in exceptional cases; and that the resolution applicant takes the corporate debtor on a 'clean slate' — claims not in the plan stand extinguished.
On 6 December 2023 a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in Cox & Kings Ltd v. SAP India Pvt Ltd, affirmed the group-of-companies doctrine as a valid and continuing part of Indian arbitration jurisprudence but re-anchored its legal foundation — moving it away from the textual hook of 'claiming through or under' in Sections 8 and 45, on which Chloro Controls had rested it, and into the consent-based definition of 'party' in Section 2(1)(h) read with Section 7. A close reading of CJI Chandrachud's judgment, the five-factor consent inquiry, the prima facie / final-call division of labour between referral court and tribunal, and what the doctrine looks like in post-Cox & Kings practice.
On 28 September 2001, a five-judge Constitution Bench upheld the constitutional validity of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 — but read its principal provision as requiring the husband to make reasonable and fair provision for the maintenance of the divorced wife beyond the iddat period, including for her future. The judgment is the foundational doctrinal contribution that preserved the maintenance architecture of Shah Bano through interpretation of the 1986 Act, and supplies the doctrinal frame within which the more recent Mohd Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana operates.
On 4 May 2026 the Supreme Court — 2026 INSC 447 — held that the threshold question of 'membership' for the oppression-and-mismanagement jurisdiction under sections 397-398 of the Companies Act 1956 (and, by parity, sections 241-242 of the Companies Act 2013) must be read through the wider definitional framework of section 2(27) of the 1956 Act (equivalently section 2(55) of the 2013 Act), and not through the narrow technical formulation of section 41(2) of the 1956 Act. Investors who have contributed share consideration but face delays in formal register entry cannot be defeated by technical defences to the petition's maintainability — a holding particularly consequential for closely held companies where register-of-members entries are routinely contested.
The Supreme Court's review judgment of 10 December 2018, authored by Justice Ashok Bhushan for a two-judge bench (Bhushan + U.U. Lalit JJ), holds that the 2015 amendment to Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 — making reference to arbitration mandatory 'notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order' — does not displace the regime of special legislation that creates non-arbitrable in rem statutory remedies. An arbitration clause in a builder-allottee agreement does not oust the jurisdiction of the consumer forum; the consumer remedy is at the consumer's option. The NCDRC Larger Bench order of 13 July 2017 was approved. The reasoning has since travelled into the RERA-CPA interface through Imperia Structures (2020) and IREO Grace Realtech (2021), with HC divergence emerging in 2024-26.
On 27 November 2019, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court — Rohinton Fali Nariman, J. (authoring), Surya Kant, J. and V. Ramasubramanian, J. — struck down Section 87 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (inserted by the 2019 Amendment) as manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14. The decision restored the no-automatic-stay regime built by the 2015 amendments and confirmed by BCCI v. Kochi Cricket (2018): a Section 34 challenge does not, of itself, stay the enforcement of an arbitral award; the award-debtor must apply separately for a stay under Section 36(3). A close reading of the architecture, the legislative-reversal pattern that brought Section 87 into being, the manifest-arbitrariness reasoning, and the practitioner discipline now stable on independent stay applications.
On 24 April 2026, the Supreme Court held that an unsuccessful party in arbitration can invoke Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 for interim relief at the post-award stage, pending Section 34 proceedings. The Court rejected the 'fruits of the award' doctrine that had restricted Section 9 to successful parties, reading Section 9's text — 'any party to an arbitration agreement' — to authorise the unsuccessful party to seek interim measures, subject to 'care, caution and circumspection'. The ruling resolves a long-standing High Court conflict and recalibrates the post-award practitioner architecture.
The May 2026 cycle in Indian insolvency law has produced three threads running in parallel — the IBBI omnibus 19 May 2026 cluster amending the CIRP, Liquidation Process and PPIRP Regulations on a single day; the May 2026 operational implementation of the IBC (Amendment) Act 2026, including the new s.12A withdrawal architecture, the 14-day admission discipline, the new Chapter IV-A creditor-initiated insolvency resolution process, the 2-year avoidance look-back and the abolition of the fast-track CIRP; and the Supreme Court's real-estate course-correction in Alpha Corp v. GNIDA, the Dhanlaxmi Bank v. Mohd. Javed Sultan IBC-as-coercive-recovery line, the e-filing-without-certified-copy discipline under s.61(2), and the NCLAT's Purusottam Behera v. SBI reading on PIRP duration. Read together, the cycle discloses the operational architecture in which Indian insolvency practice now operates.
On 2 November 2020 a two-judge bench of U.U. Lalit and Vineet Saran, JJ. — the judgment authored by Lalit J. — held that Section 79 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act 2016, which bars the civil-court jurisdiction over matters within the RERA Authority's remit, does not oust the jurisdiction of the consumer fora under the Consumer Protection Act 1986. The NCDRC and consumer fora are not 'civil courts' within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure; the Section 71(1) proviso, Section 88 and the 'without prejudice' framing of Section 18 of RERA preserve the consumer remedy alongside the RERA architecture. The choice of forum vests in the allottee, and the entitlement to maintain an action runs from the builder-buyer agreement date and not from the RERA registration date.
On 19 April 2017, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that the parties' designation of a seat of arbitration operates as an exclusive jurisdiction clause — vesting the courts at the seat with exclusive supervisory jurisdiction even where no cause of action arose there. The decision imported the international seat-as-jurisdiction principle into Indian domestic arbitration and supplied the analytic engine for the seat-versus-venue line in BGS SGS Soma JV, Mankastu Impex and Hardy Exploration.
The Supreme Court's first substantive ruling on the architecture of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016. A 2-judge bench held that the IBC, enacted under Entry 9 of List III, prevails over inconsistent State moratoria through *Section 238* read with Article 254; the *Section 7* admission enquiry is narrow — confined to whether a financial debt and default exist — and once those facts are made out the National Company Law Tribunal must admit, with no residual 'I deem fit' discretion. The decision framed the post-2016 'paradigm shift' away from debtor-in-possession, was diluted by *Vidarbha* in 2022, and was substantially restored by *M. Suresh Kumar Reddy* in 2023.
On 11 January 2021 a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court — Justices Indu Malhotra and Indira Banerjee — held that one-sided clauses in an apartment buyer's agreement, heavily favouring the developer through asymmetric cancellation, token delay compensation and restricted refund rights, constitute 'unfair trade practice' within Section 2(1)(r) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The allottee is not bound by such clauses; the developer cannot enforce one-sided forfeiture; the consumer forum has jurisdiction to refuse enforcement; and where the developer fails to deliver possession, the allottee is entitled to refund with interest. The judgment formalises the 'one-sided clause' doctrine first articulated in Wing Cdr Arifur Rahman Khan v. DLF Southern Homes (August 2020) and aligns with Emaar MGF v. Aftab Singh (2018) on the preservation of statutory remedies against private contractual ouster.
On 5 February 2019 a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that the Committee of Creditors' commercial wisdom in approving or rejecting a resolution plan by the requisite voting majority is non-justiciable. The National Company Law Tribunal's judicial review under *Section 31* is confined to *Section 30(2)* compliance — it cannot second-guess the CoC's commercial judgment. On rejection of all plans by the CoC, the Adjudicating Authority is obliged to initiate liquidation under *Section 33(1)*. The decision is the foundational articulation of the commercial-wisdom doctrine that organises post-2019 IBC jurisprudence.
On 4 February 2026 a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court — Justices Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran — set aside the NCDRC's order of 23 August 2023 holding that a consumer complaint was maintainable despite prior RERA proceedings. The Court held that where two concurrent fora are available for the same cause of action, the homebuyer must elect one; having elected RERA, the homebuyer cannot retract to a parallel consumer-forum remedy on the same grievance. The decision narrows the concurrent-jurisdiction rule of Imperia Structures (2020) by overlaying election-of-remedies discipline — concurrent jurisdiction is preserved as a menu choice, not a buffet allowing migration mid-litigation. Concurrent jurisdiction at the outset is preserved; what is foreclosed is successive recourse to a second forum after election.
On 30 May 2022 a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court, in Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd v. A. Balakrishnan, held that the liability arising from a Recovery Certificate issued by a Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 19 of the RDDBFI Act is a 'financial debt' within the meaning of Section 5(8) of the IBC, that the holder of such a Certificate is a 'financial creditor' under Section 5(7) entitled to file a Section 7 application, and — most consequentially for limitation practice — that the Certificate creates a fresh cause of action so that limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act runs from the date of its issuance, not from the date of the original default. A close reading of the bench's reasoning, its extension of the Dena Bank v. C. Shivakumar Reddy line, and what the ruling has come to mean for banks, ARCs and corporate debtors at the s.7 admission stage.
On 18 March 1997 a seven-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in a unanimous judgment authored by Chief Justice A.M. Ahmadi, struck down clause 2(d) of Article 323A and clause 3(d) of Article 323B to the extent they excluded the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts and of the Supreme Court over decisions of administrative tribunals. Judicial review under Articles 32, 226 and 227 was held to be part of the basic structure of the Constitution, tribunals were repositioned as courts of first instance rather than substitutes for High Courts, and the 'alternative institutional mechanism' theory of S.P. Sampath Kumar (1987) was partly overruled.
On 21 May 2021 a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court, in Lalit Kumar Jain v. Union of India, upheld the Central Government's MCA Notification of 15 November 2019 selectively bringing Part III of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code into force for personal guarantors of corporate debtors as valid conditional legislation, and held that approval of a resolution plan for a corporate debtor under Section 31 does not, of itself, discharge a personal guarantor — surety liability rests on the independent footing of Section 128 of the Contract Act. A close reading of the judgment authored by Justice Ravindra Bhat, the doctrinal architecture of the Section 60(2) common-forum design, and the doctrinal arc through Dilip B. Jiwrajka.
On 11 August 2023, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court restored an arbitrator's award of 18% compound interest after the Allahabad High Court had reduced it to 9% simple interest under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. The ruling reaffirms that the Section 34 court has no power to modify; it may only set aside. Two years on, the 5-judge Constitution Bench in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft has qualified — not overruled — the proposition. A close reading of the holding, its lineage from Associate Builders through M. Hakeem, and the narrow modification corridor that Gayatri Balasamy has opened.
On 24 March 2026 a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court — Surya Kant CJ, Ujjal Bhuyan and N. Kotiswar Singh JJ — held that the denial of Permanent Commission to women Short Service Commission Officers across the Army, Navy and Air Force was the consequence of a structurally discriminatory evaluation framework, not of individual merit assessments. Invoking Article 142, the Court created a legal fiction of deemed completion of 20 years' qualifying service for SSCWOs released during the long litigation, preserved already-granted Permanent Commissions, and directed that serving SSCWOs meeting the 60% Selection Board cut-off be granted Permanent Commission subject to medical and disciplinary clearance. A digest of the holding, the structural-discrimination reasoning, and the Article 142 remedial architecture that closes the Babita Puniya / Annie Nagaraja / Nitisha line.
Across two engagements separated by four years, the Supreme Court has held the Tribunals Reforms architecture introduced by the Union to be inconsistent with the constitutional protection of judicial independence. In July 2021, a three-judge bench struck down provisions of the Tribunals Reforms (Rationalisation and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2021 by 2:1. In November 2025, a two-judge bench led by Chief Justice B.R. Gavai held that the Tribunals Reform Act, 2021 was unconstitutional and inconsistent with the basic structure. A digest of both engagements, the doctrinal frame, and the tribunal-independence architecture they leave.
On 19 January 2021 a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court — Justices Rohinton Nariman, Navin Sinha and K.M. Joseph — upheld the constitutional validity of the IBC (Amendment) Act 2020 which inserted the second proviso to Section 7(1) requiring real-estate allottees to file jointly with a minimum of 100 allottees of the same project or 10 per cent of the total allottees (whichever is less). The bench held the threshold a reasonable Article 14 classification, treated the Article 19(1)(g) and Article 21 challenges as not made out (Article 21 expressly because alternative RERA and Consumer Protection Act remedies remained available), preserved the homebuyer-as-financial-creditor status validated in Pioneer Urban (2019), and exercised Article 142 to grant a 30-day window to pending applicants to align their pleadings with the new threshold. A close reading of Justice Nariman's judgment and what the threshold means for the present practitioner advising on a real-estate Section 7 application.
On 17 April 1985, a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court — majority opinion authored by Rangnath Misra J. on behalf of himself and three other judges, with a separate concurring opinion by O. Chinnappa Reddy J. — unanimously held that excise duty paid directly by McDowell's buyers to the State to obtain distillery passes formed part of McDowell's turnover under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957; the structural arrangement was a colourable device. The majority articulated that tax planning within the law is legitimate but colourable devices cannot be part of tax planning; Chinnappa Reddy J.'s concurrence went further, drawing on the UK Ramsay–Burmah Oil–Dawson line to urge a substance-over-form approach. A digest of the bench composition (as independently verifiable), the architecture of the Andhra excise scheme, the doctrinal contribution, and the post-McDowell arc through Azadi Bachao, Vodafone, and the statutory GAAR.
On 10 July 2024, a two-judge bench of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Augustine George Masih held that a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 144 of the BNSS, 2023) against her husband, and that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 operates in addition to — not in derogation of — that secular maintenance right. The judgment is the most consequential restoration of the Shah Bano line in the post-1986 period.
On 5 May 2017, a three-judge bench of Justices Dipak Misra, R. Banumathi and Ashok Bhushan dismissed the appeals filed by the four adult convicts in the December 2012 Delhi gang-rape and murder — known to public memory as the Nirbhaya case — and affirmed the death sentence imposed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the Delhi High Court. The judgment applied the rarest-of-rare doctrine articulated in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) and held that the offence fell within its scope. A digest of the holding, the doctrinal application, and the architecture of capital sentencing it confirms.
On 26 April 2013, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court upheld SEBI's market-access debarment and ₹50 lakh adjudicating-officer penalty against a whole-time director of Pyramid Saimira Theatre Ltd. for fraudulent misstatement of financial results under Section 12A of the SEBI Act and the PFUTP Regulations. Directors closely associated with management, the Court held, cannot 'shut their eyes to what must be obvious to everyone' — red flags in revenues, profits, receivables and deposits engage an affirmative duty of inquiry, and passivity is not a defence. The judgment is the foundational SC authority on whole-time-director liability for company-level securities fraud; the proposition has often been read more broadly than the case decides.
On 11 November 2021 a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court — U.U. Lalit, Ajay Rastogi and Aniruddha Bose, JJ., the judgment authored by Rastogi J. — answered five framed questions on the constitutional and statutory architecture of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act 2016. The Bench held that the application of the Act to 'ongoing projects' — projects launched before but not completion-certificated by 1 May 2017 — is retroactive in operation and not retrospective, and is constitutionally permissible. The pre-deposit requirement under the proviso to Section 43(5) for promoter appeals was upheld; the Authority's single-member adjudicatory power to award refund-with-interest under Section 18 read with state Rules was upheld; and the refund-with-interest formula under the UP Rules — MCLR + 1% per annum — was read as part of the substantive architecture.
On 25 April 2023, a five-judge Constitution Bench in N.N. Global Mercantile v. Indo Unique Flame held by 3:2 that an unstamped arbitration agreement could not be acted upon under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. Eight months later, on 13 December 2023, a seven-judge Constitution Bench in In Re Interplay overruled it unanimously — restoring separability, kompetenz-kompetenz and the prima facie referral standard, and confining stamping to a curable Section 35 admissibility question for the tribunal. A close reading of the architecture, the 3:2 split, the seven-judge overruling, what was decided, what was left for the tribunal, and how the arc from SMS Tea Estates (2011) to Tarini Mohanty (2026) now reads end-to-end.
On 19 May 2022, a three-judge bench presided by Justice Uday Umesh Lalit — through a judgment authored by Justice S. Ravindra Bhat — held that the secondment of expatriate employees by overseas group entities of *Northern Operating Systems Pvt. Ltd.* constituted a taxable supply of manpower under the Finance Act 1994, attracting reverse-charge service tax. Substance, not the form of the secondment contract, was held to govern; the employment matrix — payroll, social security, the right of repatriation — remaining with the overseas entity was decisive. The Court denied the Revenue the extended period of limitation under *Section 73*. The judgment has since travelled into the GST era through a wave of *Section 74* notices and a moderating CBIC instruction.
On 1 April 2013 a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court dismissed Novartis's decade-long campaign for an Indian patent on the beta-crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate — sold abroad as Glivec (and as Gleevec in the United States). The Court read *Section 3(d)* of the *Patents Act 1970* as a heightened patentability filter for incremental pharmaceutical claims, glossed 'efficacy' as 'therapeutic efficacy', and held that improvements in bioavailability, hygroscopicity and flow are physico-chemical attributes that do not, without more, cross the s.3(d) threshold. The judgment supplied the doctrinal architecture for India's post-TRIPS anti-evergreening regime and remains the anchoring authority on incremental-pharma patentability.
On 12 August 2005 a seven-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra, refined T.M.A. Pai (2002) on the four-fold typology of educational institutions and held that the State cannot impose reservation or admission quotas on private unaided professional institutions — minority or non-minority. Chief Justice Lahoti's unanimous judgment endorsed common entrance testing, retained the Islamic Academy regulatory-committee model for fees in an interim role, disapproved Islamic Academy's directions on State-percentage quotas in unaided institutions, and held that Article 29(2) does not override Article 30(1) in minority unaided institutions — vindicating the partial dissent of Quadri J and Ruma Pal J in T.M.A. Pai. The 93rd Constitutional Amendment Act 2005, inserting Article 15(5), was Parliament's direct legislative response.
On 20 April 2021, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court resolved a long-running circuit split and held that two Indian-incorporated parties may validly choose a foreign seat of arbitration. The resulting award is a foreign award enforceable under Part II of the 1996 Act, not a domestic award; and the Indian parties retain access to Section 9 interim relief through the proviso to Section 2(2). The judgment treats party autonomy as the dominant principle of Indian arbitration, even where the analytic invites attention to public-policy and contract-law objections.
On 26 November 2019 a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court, in Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd, extended TRF v. Energo from the narrow case of an ineligible MD nominating himself a substitute to the broader principle that a person who is himself statutorily ineligible by reason of interest in the dispute cannot — even where he does not appoint himself — be the unilateral appointing authority. The Court appointed an independent sole arbitrator under Section 11(6). A close reading of Justice Uday Umesh Lalit's judgment, the doctrinal architecture, and the recalibration by the Constitution Bench in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification (8 November 2024).
On 1 February 2021 a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court, in Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd v. Spade Financial Services Ltd, supplied the definitive Indian statement of the substantive content of financial debt — disbursement, consideration for the time value of money, and the commercial-effect-of-borrowing test — and held that collusive or sham transactions structured to mimic loans do not give rise to financial-creditor status. The judgment also extended the related-party exclusion in the first proviso to Section 21(2) to entities that were related to the corporate debtor at the time the debt was incurred but had since formally divested, rejecting a mechanical 'praesenti' reading. A close reading of Justice Chandrachud's judgment, the doctrinal architecture, and the post-Phoenix practice.
On 9 August 2019 a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court, in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India, upheld the 2018 Amendment to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code that deemed homebuyer advances 'commercial effect of borrowing' and thereby financial debt under Section 5(8)(f), held that IBC and RERA operate in different fields and co-exist harmoniously with Section 238 IBC controlling on conflict, and drew the doctrinal line between genuine allottees with possession intent and speculative investors seeking only refund or profit. A close reading of Justice Nariman's judgment, the constitutional analysis on Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 300A, the field-occupation reasoning and what practitioners advising developers and homebuyers should take from the case.
Read through the coordination lens rather than the constitutional-validity lens, Pioneer Urban v. Union of India is the case that built the structural relationship between RERA and the IBC. The three-judge bench held that the two statutes occupy different fields, that Section 88 RERA preserves remedies under other laws additively, that the Section 238 IBC non-obstante clause is engaged only on an actual operational conflict, and that the same homebuyer can simultaneously stand as RERA allottee, CPA consumer and IBC financial creditor. The genuine-allottee/speculative-investor distinction is the IBC's internal abuse-prevention valve, examined at the Section 7 admission stage and reinforced by the Section 65 discipline. This editorial draws the textual map, the field-occupation analysis and the downstream architecture leading to Manish Kumar (2021) and the project-wise CIRP codified by the IBC (Amendment) Act 2026.
On 30 July 1992 a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka read the right to education out of Article 21 read with the Directive Principles in Articles 38, 39, 41 and 45 and struck down capitation fees in professional colleges. Seven months later, on 4 February 1993, a five-judge Constitution Bench in Unni Krishnan v. State of A.P. refined and re-stated the right — bifurcating its content so that free and compulsory education up to the age of fourteen became enforceable as a fundamental right (later codified as Article 21A by the 86th Amendment) while education beyond that age remained subject to the State's economic capacity. The Bench also imposed the free-seats / payment-seats scheme on private unaided professional institutions and capped capitation fees as unconstitutional. The combined two-step articulation set the doctrinal frame from which the 86th Amendment (2002), the RTE Act 2009, Society for Unaided Private Schools (2012) and Pramati (2014) all proceeded.
On 10 February 1970, an eleven-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court struck down the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1969 by a ten-to-one majority. Justice J.C. Shah's majority judgment did three doctrinally distinct things: it read Article 31(2) compensation as a 'just equivalent', it replaced the object/subject test with an effect test, and it overruled A.K. Gopalan's silo theory of fundamental rights — the analytical move that, eight years later, made the golden triangle of Maneka Gandhi possible.
On 3 October 2024, a two-judge bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Sanjay Karol held that the textual choice of 'plant or machinery' — rather than 'plant and machinery' — in *Section 17(5)(d) of the CGST Act, 2017* was deliberate, and that a building could qualify as 'plant' for input-tax-credit purposes if the functionality test was satisfied. The Finance Act 2025 substituted 'and' for 'or' with retrospective effect from 1 July 2017, nullifying the reading; the review petition was dismissed on 20 May 2025; constitutional challenges to the retrospective amendment are now mounting in the High Courts. A digest of the holding, the legislative reversal, and the live constitutional terrain.
On 31 August 2012, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court delivered the most consequential ruling on the SEBI–MCA jurisdictional boundary the regulatory architecture had seen. Two Sahara group companies had raised approximately ₹24,029.73 crore from around three crore investors through optionally fully convertible debentures, calling the issue a private placement. The Court held the issues were deemed public offers under the first proviso to Section 67(3) of the Companies Act, 1956, brought them squarely within SEBI's jurisdiction, and directed refund of approximately ₹17,400 crore with 15 per cent interest into a SEBI-administered account. The judgment reset the listing-trigger architecture, foreshadowed the Companies Act, 2013 private-placement framework, and produced one of the longest-running enforcement sagas in Indian regulatory history.
On 6 May 2004, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India — Ruma Pal, J. and P. Venkatarama Reddi, J. — held that a domain name is more than a mere internet address; it functions as a business identifier capable of trade-mark protection under the Trade Marks Act 1999 and the common-law tort of passing off. The Court reversed the Karnataka High Court Division Bench and restored the City Civil Judge Bangalore's interim injunction against Siffynet Solutions in favour of Satyam Infoway. A close reading of the territoriality of cyberspace question, the classical trinity test applied to coined word marks, the dicta on the UDRP and ICANN architecture and the foundational role of the judgment in the .in INDRP framework.
On 18 May 2026, a two-judge bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih clarified that Section 6(5) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — which protects pre-2004 partitions from the retroactive coparcenary amendment of 2005 — does not create a jurisdictional bar to a partition suit and does not extinguish the independent statutory succession rights of Class I heirs under Section 8. The judgment reinforces the doctrinal architecture that Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020) had established and clarifies the relationship between the coparcenary line and the intestate succession line under the Hindu Succession Act.
On 17 March 2026, a two-judge bench of Justices Pankaj Mithal and Prasanna B. Varale held that amounts received by the dependants of the deceased under employer-provided group insurance — or under other contractual or social-security benefits — cannot be treated as 'pecuniary advantages' liable to be deducted from compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The judgment affirms the prior doctrinal line that advantages accruing from contracts performed during the deceased's lifetime are not outcomes of the death itself, and produces a working frame for the just-compensation architecture in motor-accident claims.
On 26 May 2026, a Supreme Court bench of Justices K.V. Viswanathan and Vijay Bishnoi modified a life sentence to the period already undergone by the appellant — a man who had spent over twenty-three years in custody without remission. The judgment reaffirms the settled position that the imposition of a life sentence does not bar modification to a fixed-term sentence where the convict has already undergone more than 14 years of imprisonment, and reads against the architecture of remission and pre-mature release under the criminal-justice system.
On 27 January 2026, a two-judge bench of Justices Pankaj Mithal and S.V.N. Bhatti held that disputes relating to the employment, termination, or alleged sham nature of contract labour arrangements must be adjudicated by a Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — and that the State's reference jurisdiction operates even on an apprehended dispute and is not foreclosed by the absence of a prior written demand on the employer. The judgment reaffirms the SAIL safeguards for contract labour and supplies a working architecture for contract-labour litigation.
On 17 March 2026 a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court (J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan JJ., judgment authored by Viswanathan J.) held that the use-of-proceeds objects disclosed by an issuer for a preferential issue are market-facing regulatory commitments under the SEBI (ICDR) Regulations 2009, and that post-allotment diversion of those proceeds constitutes fraud under the PFUTP Regulations 2003 — not curable by a subsequent shareholder ratification resolution or by an alteration of the Memorandum of Association. The Court separately confirmed that proceedings under sections 11 and 11B of the SEBI Act 1992 by the Whole-Time Member and adjudication under section 15HA by the Adjudicating Officer occupy distinct preventive and punitive spheres, and may be pursued in parallel.
On 17 February 2010, a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court — Balakrishnan CJ, Raveendran, D.K. Jain (authoring for the unanimous Bench), Sathasivam and Panchal JJ — held that the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 and of the Supreme Court under Article 32 is plenary and constitutional, and that a High Court may direct the Central Bureau of Investigation to investigate a cognisable offence within a State even without the State's consent under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 1946. Judicial review is part of the basic structure; the constitutional power cannot be fettered by ordinary legislation. But the power is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases, to preserve federal balance. A close reading of the judgment, the underlying Garbeta incident, and the federalism architecture the Bench was working through.
On 6 September 2022 a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court, in State Tax Officer (1) v. Rainbow Papers Ltd, read Section 48 of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act 2003 — which creates a first charge on the dealer's property in respect of VAT dues — as creating a 'security interest' by operation of law within Section 3(31) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, with the consequence that the State became a 'secured creditor' under Section 3(30) and a resolution plan that wholly ignored the statutory dues was non-compliant with Section 30(2). A coordinate bench in Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam v. Raman Ispat then confined the holding to its facts. A close reading of the GVAT-IBC architecture, the Section 53 waterfall analysis, the doctrinal arc that has followed, and what practitioners advising resolution applicants and statutory authorities should take from the case.
On 26 August 2022 a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court, in Sundaresh Bhatt, Liquidator of ABG Shipyard v. Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs, held that once a moratorium is imposed under Section 14 or Section 33(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, the Customs Act yields to the IBC by force of Section 238. The Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs retains the power to assess and determine the quantum of customs duty payable, but cannot initiate recovery, sale or confiscation of the corporate debtor's goods during the moratorium; the customs claim must be filed before the IRP or liquidator and ranks in the Section 53 waterfall. A close reading of Chief Justice Ramana's judgment, the spheres-of-operation reasoning and the doctrinal arc through Paschimanchal.
On 25 January 2019 a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court upheld the *Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016* in its entirety against a battery of Article 14, Article 19(1)(g) and Article 300A challenges. The judgment installed an intelligible-differentia rationale for the financial-creditor / operational-creditor distinction, read down *Section 29A* to confine its sweep to specified categories of ineligible resolution applicants, and directed practical fixes to the *NCLT / NCLAT* tribunal architecture including circuit benches. The 'defaulter's paradise is lost' framing has organised the post-2019 narrative on the Code's transformative purpose.
On 26 March 2021, a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court set aside the NCLAT's reinstatement of Cyrus Mistry as Executive Chairman of Tata Sons and read down its order recasting Article 75 of the Tata Sons Articles of Association. The judgment delivers two doctrinal resets: a removal from the Board — even of a director nominated by a significant minority shareholder — does not by itself amount to oppression under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013; and Articles of Association are not per se invalid merely because they confer powers that could potentially be exercised oppressively. The challenge, the Court held, must be to the exercise of the power, not to its existence.
On 15 January 2026, a two-judge bench — Justice R. Mahadevan in the principal opinion, with Justice J.B. Pardiwala concurring — held that the General Anti-Avoidance Rule in Chapter X-A of the *Income-tax Act, 1961* applies to any arrangement yielding a tax benefit on or after 1 April 2017, even for pre-2017 investments structured to claim Mauritius treaty benefits. The Tax Residency Certificate, the Court held, remains a relevant factor but is no longer conclusive for GAAR purposes; the *Azadi Bachao Andolan* line on TRC-as-conclusive-evidence is substantially modified. A digest of the holding, the 2016 Protocol grandfathering architecture, and the practitioner fallout that has emerged through May-June 2026.
On 31 October 2002 an eleven-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, comprehensively re-stated the law on educational institutions in India — recognising the right to establish and administer an institution as an occupation under Article 19(1)(g), settling the State-wise determination of minority status, drawing the four-fold aided/unaided × minority/non-minority typology that still governs the field, overruling the free-seats/payment-seats scheme of Unni Krishnan as applied to private unaided institutions, and reading down the rigid 50% cap of St. Stephen's College on minority preference. A close reading of Chief Justice Kirpal's majority, the five separate opinions, the partial dissents of Quadri J and Ruma Pal J on the Article 29(2)/30(1) interaction, and the doctrinal arc through Islamic Academy, Inamdar, the 93rd Amendment and the RTE Act.
On 14 December 2017 a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court, in Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. M/S Prius Auto Industries Ltd, affirmed the Delhi High Court Division Bench's reversal of an ad-interim injunction in favour of Toyota and dismissed Toyota's appeal. The judgment, authored by Justice Ranjan Gogoi for himself and Justice Navin Sinha, holds that trans-border reputation under Indian passing-off law is governed by the territoriality principle — a foreign mark must demonstrate substantial spillover goodwill in Indian territory at the relevant date, here April 2001, and the classical trinity of goodwill, misrepresentation and damage applies even where the mark is globally famous. The judgment reads down Whirlpool (1996) and Milmet Oftho (2004) without overruling them and aligns Indian law with the English Starbucks (HK) approach. A close reading of the judgment's procedural posture, the territoriality holding, and what practitioners should plead in trans-border reputation suits.
On 3 July 2017 a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court, in TRF Ltd v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd, held that where an arbitration clause authorises the Managing Director of a party to act as sole arbitrator or to nominate one, and that MD is statutorily ineligible under Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, the MD cannot act as arbitrator and equally cannot nominate a substitute — 'once the infrastructure collapses, the superstructure is bound to collapse.' A close reading of Justice Dipak Misra's judgment, the doctrinal architecture, the 2015 Amendment background and what the holding seeded for Perkins Eastman and Central Organisation for Railway Electrification.
On 16 May 2025, a Supreme Court bench of Justices A.S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan struck down the 2017 Notification and the 2021 Office Memorandum that had enabled ex post facto environmental clearances, holding that retrospective approval was foreign to the architecture of Indian environmental regulation. On 18 November 2025, a different bench led by Chief Justice B.R. Gavai — sitting with Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Bhuyan — recalled that judgment by 2:1, with Bhuyan J. now in dissent. A digest of both judgments, the doctrinal disagreement, and what the environmental-clearance architecture now looks like.
On 12 July 2022 a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court, in Vidarbha Industries Power Ltd v. Axis Bank Ltd, read the word 'may' in Section 7(5)(a) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code as conferring discretion on the adjudicating authority to refuse admission of an otherwise-eligible Section 7 application — an apparent dilution of the Innoventive 'mandatory-admission-on-proof-of-debt-and-default' rule. The reception was sharp; the review was dismissed; a coordinate bench in Maganlal Daga flagged the inconsistency; and a coordinate bench in M. Suresh Kumar Reddy v. Canara Bank confined Vidarbha to its facts. A close reading of the textual contrast between Sections 7(5)(a) and 9(5)(a), the APTEL-award factual matrix, and the doctrinal arc that has, in operational terms, restored Innoventive to its place.
On 14 December 2020 a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court, in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, restated and tightened the in rem / in personam taxonomy of Booz Allen into a structured four-fold test for non-arbitrability, held tenancy disputes under the Transfer of Property Act arbitrable, overruled N. Radhakrishnan on the arbitrability of fraud, and recalibrated the standard of judicial review under Sections 8 and 11 in favour of competence-competence. A close reading of Justice Sanjiv Khanna's lead judgment, Justice Ramana's concurring opinion, the doctrinal architecture and what the bar should plead in the post-Vidya Drolia world.
On 18 December 1997 a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court led by Chief Justice J.S. Verma, hearing the Jain hawala public interest litigation, issued a set of structural directions to insulate the Central Bureau of Investigation and the Enforcement Directorate from executive interference. The judgment fixed a two-year tenure for the CBI Director, gave the Central Vigilance Commission statutory status, struck down the 'Single Directive', and operationalised continuing mandamus as a tool of monitored investigation. It is the foundational case in modern Indian PIL practice.
On 20 January 2012, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court — S.H. Kapadia C.J., K.S. Radhakrishnan J. and Swatanter Kumar J. — unanimously held that the transfer of a single share in a Cayman Islands holding company (CGP) between two non-residents did not give rise to capital gains taxable in India under Section 9(1)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, even though the share's value was rooted in the Hutch–Vodafone Indian telecom chain; the look-at test was adopted, and the Revenue's USD 2.2 billion demand was quashed. Parliament responded with the Finance Act 2012 retrospective amendment to Section 9(1)(i); Vodafone then commenced a treaty arbitration under the India–Netherlands BIT and prevailed; the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act 2021 ultimately rolled back the retrospective amendment. A digest of the judgment, its statutory architecture, and the doctrinal arc that has followed.
On 15 January 2026, a Supreme Court bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan held in Elegna Co-operative Housing Society v. Edelweiss ARC that once a financial debt and default are established, admission under Section 7 of the IBC is mandatory — viability, prejudice to homebuyers, and creditor motive are wholly extraneous. A digest of the disposition, the doctrinal lineage from Innoventive through Vidarbha to M. Suresh Kumar Reddy, and what the homebuyer locus question looks like after Elegna and the companion Mansi Brar Fernandes line.
On 21 November 2025, the Supreme Court stayed proceedings in GR Infra Projects Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, prima facie holding that a show-cause notice under Section 74 of the CGST Act that sets out only figures, without a factual narration of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression, is legally deficient. The order has shaped the High Court line on Section 74 and, by extension, on Section 74A — which now governs the extended-limitation regime from 1 April 2024 — and reaffirms the jurisdictional-fact doctrine for the extended-limitation framework.
On 2 April 2026, a Supreme Court bench of Justices P.S. Narasimha and Alok Aradhe held in Rajiv Gaddh v. Subodh Parkash that a subsequent application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — based on the same cause of action as one already abandoned — is barred on the principles contained in Order 23 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A digest of the ruling, the facts that drove it, the doctrinal extension into the appointment stage, and what it tells practitioners about strategy and abandonment.
On 11 March 2026, a Supreme Court bench of Justices Rajesh Bindal and Vijay Bishnoi held in M. Thanigivelu v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board that training is part of the service for the purposes of seniority — and that an administrative Board Proceeding cannot retrospectively re-date the seniority of direct recruits to align them with promotees. The judgment restates a longstanding service-jurisprudence principle in the language of the TNEB Service Regulations and clarifies the limits on the State employer's discretion to reorder service hierarchies through administrative instruments.